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Mom: This work grew out of our conversations and is dedicated to you. Thank you for being 
the Nietzsche, or at least the Eckhart Tolle, to my ‘Schopenschluter.’ 
 
Dad: You footed the bill and never batted an eyelash about it. May this work show you my 
appreciation, or maybe just that I took it all seriously. 
  
Peter and Kit: You’ve shown me time and time again that giving yourself to what you love is 
most important. You are wells of inspiration. Never dry up. 
  
Daniel Berthold: I could never express how much you’ve taught me. But here’s one thing: 
you taught me to revise – words, thoughts, actions. Thank you. 
  
Franz Kempf: Sie lehrten mich Deutsch, die  h e i l i g s t e  Sprache, die Sprache meiner 
Seelenverwandten. Ohne Ihre Hilfe hätte ich dieses Projekt nie bewältigen können. Ich bin 
Ihnen ewig dankbar.  
  
Kritika Yegnashankaran: Without your encouragement, I never would have stuck it out at 
Bard or with philosophy. I hope this project proves that to be a good thing.  
 
Susan Rogers: The only other person I’ve met who’s really lived the Schopenhauer-Nietzsche 
struggle.  
 
Garry Hagberg: Every sentence I’ve ever heard you utter has been lucid, insightful, and more 
polished than anything I could spend a sleepless night writing and revising.  
 
 Gary, Andrea, Ali, Elaine; all the Meaghers, Schluters, Clevelands, Yoders, and Fields; all 
the Holmes and Haffenreffers; Ted, Damon, Tommy; Luka, Wilfred, Maude, Pookie (RIP); 
and everyone, everyone, everyone who isn’t mentioned here but really should be or just kind 
of wants to be or maybe just happened to thumb through this book in the Bard library or 
something like that and thought, Hey, this guy’s alright by me: You are my life, my world, I 
do this for you. 
 






















































Note on translations, texts, and sources 
 
 In this project, I analyze and compare the works of three German authors: Hermann 
Hesse (1877-1962), Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). 
As there is no single translator of all three, I have supplied translations in order to keep 
overlapping terms consistent and draw delineations when necessary. Hesse citations are 
primarily drawn from Gesammelte Dichtungen (Suhrkamp, 1958) and the second volume of 
Materialen zu Hermann Hesses »Siddhartha« (Suhrkamp, 1986), as edited by Volker 
Michels. Citations from Schopenhauer’s Welt als Wille und Vorstellung are from the Insel 
Taschenbuch edition (1996). Nietzsche citations are drawn from either Werke 
(Zweitausendeins, 1999), edited by Ivo Frenzel, or from the Kritische Studienausgabe 
(Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2011), edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. All 












































Ecce Homo, Friedrich Nietzsche 
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, Friedrich Nietzsche  
Gesammelte Dichtungen (vol. 3, 5, or 7), Hermann Hesse 
Götzen-Dämmerung, Friedrich Nietzsche 
Zur Genealogie der Moral, Friedrich Nietzsche 
Gesammelte Schriften (vol. 7), Hermann Hesse 
Gesammelte Werkausgabe (vol. 12), Hermann Hesse 
Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Friedrich Nietzsche 
Die Reden des Buddha: Mittlere Sammlung, trans. Karl Neumann 
Schopenhauer und Nietzsche, Georg Simmel 
Über die vierfache Würzel des Satzes vom Zureichenden Grund, Arthur 
Schopenhauer 
Sämtliche Werke (vol. 18 or 19), Hermann Hesse 
Materialen zu Hermann Hesses »Demian« (vol. 1), ed. Volker Michels 
Materialen zu Hermann Hesses »Siddhartha«, (vol. 1 or 2), ed. Volker Michels 
Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung , vol. 1/2, Arthur Schopenhauer 
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Simmel’s Problem, Hesse’s Solution 
 
Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche are undoubtedly the most powerful and 
antithetical philosophers of nineteenth century Germany who attempt to understand the value 
and meaning of life in the world. Their driving questions are just as necessary to consider 
today as they were almost two centuries ago. Ought we – as Schopenhauer first calls out in 
1818 with the publication of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung [The World as Will and 
Representation] – stifle or even deny the Will to Live, the fundamental urge of all living 
creatures toward continued existence, which can maintain itself only through endless cycles 
of thoughtless slaughter and unjustifiable sufferings? Or must we – as Nietzsche answers 
Schopenhauer’s call half a century later – find a way to affirm life by recognizing suffering as 
something meaningful, something that spurs us on, something that is ultimately justified by 
what we make of our lives? 
In 1907, Georg Simmel, seminal German sociologist and philosopher, publishes a 
series of lectures – tersely titled, Schopenhauer und Nietzsche [Schopenhauer and Nietzsche] 
– in which he attempts to find meaning in the antithesis of these two intellectual giants. 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, he concludes, are not merely philosophers with opposing 
worldviews. Much more than this, they are the purest examples of a fundamental antithesis of 
the human spirit itself. At one pole, there is Schopenhauer’s life- and world-denial, at the 
other, Nietzsche’s absolute love and affirmation of the world and life. As conscientious, self-
reflective beings, Simmel believes, we necessarily inhabit the space between the two. We are 
torn apart by innate, competing urges for creative self-assertion and compassionate self-
resignation, and the dissonance between the two causes us to question our role as living 
creatures.  
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Simmel, in the final pages of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, leaves us with a new 
philosophical problem: these opposing poles, or urges, of the spirit, he asserts, cannot be 
reconciled or synthesized. In the final paragraph, he writes,  
Nach einem Frieden zwischen diesen Gegnern zu suchen, ist… wie jedes nutzlose 
Unternehmen, schlimmer als nutzlos, weil es den Sinn ihrer Gegensätzlichkeiten, und 
damit den Sinn eines jeden an und für sich fälscht. 
 
To search for peace between these two opponents is… like any useless enterprise. 
Indeed, it is worse than useless, for it falsifies the meaning of their polarities and 
thereby the meaning of each philosopher in and for himself. (407-08) 
 
Any attempt to strike a unity between these two urges, Simmel reasons, is doomed to fail; the 
most we can do is live our lives between the poles. Simmel’s conclusion, though, should not 
be read as a grim confession of impotence. Rather, he presents it as a radical affirmation and 
celebration of the human condition itself. By respecting, cherishing, and cultivating both 
poles in equal measure, Simmel maintains, the individual is able to harness this tension and 
cultivate a noble and balanced personality (408). 
Simmel is not the only German intellectual of the early twentieth century who 
engages the antithetical philosophies of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. There is also Hermann 
Hesse, a generation younger than Simmel, who, reflecting on his life after receiving the 
Nobel Prize for literature in 1946, holds Schopenhauer and Nietzsche to be the German 
philosophers from whom he drew the most influence (Nobel Lectures 419). Hesse himself, 
having never read Simmel’s Schopenhauer und Nietzsche,1 even comes to recognize their 
polar influence on his thought. He writes in the Schopenhauer Jahrbuch (Schopenhauer 
Yearbook) in 1938, 
Mit Schopenhauer begann ich mich schon in jenen Jünglingsjahren, in denen 
Nietzsche meine Hauptlektüre war, zu beschäftigen. Je mehr Nietzsche dann in 
den Hintergrund trat, desto mehr fühlte ich mich zu Schopenhauer hingezogen. 
 
I began my engagement with Schopenhauer in those youthful years, during which 
Nietzsche composed the bulk of my reading. As Nietzsche moved further into the 
background, I felt myself more and more attracted to Schopenhauer. (GW12 257) 
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Hesse’s brief remark points to a revealing trend in his relationship to the philosophies of 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche: the intensity of his engagement with one stands in an inverse 
proportion to his engagement with the other. That is, his readings of Schopenhauer do not just 
become more frequent and intense, but they begin to outweigh and replace his readings of 
Nietzsche. He describes himself as feeling attracted (hingezogen) to Schopenhauer, as one 
would describe a positively charged magnet being pulled toward a negative pole. The parallel 
between Hesse’s statement and the conclusion to Simmel’s Schopenhauer und Nietzsche is 
striking and serves to show that Hesse, like Simmel, feels and understands the opposing 
power of the Schopenhauerian and Nietzschean worldviews. 
Confrontations between antithetical worldviews are indeed central to many of Hesse’s 
works. For instance, in Steppenwolf (1927), the civil is pitted against the animal, and in 
Narziß und Goldmund (Narzissus and Goldmund) (1930), the sensual against the spiritual. 
One work above all others, however, stands out as an aesthetic representation of the struggle 
between the Schopenhauerian and the Nietzschean: Siddhartha: Eine indische Dichtung 
(Siddhartha: An Indian Tale) (1922).  
Siddhartha is the tale of a young boy, Siddhartha, who grows up among the priestly, 
Brahmanic caste in an ancient Indian city. Unsatisfied with his life and desirous of attaining 
spiritual enlightenment, he flees from his home with his friend, Govinda, to join a band of 
wanderings ascetics, the Samanas. After years spent practicing the rituals of the Samanas 
without success, Siddhartha and Govinda flee again and make way to one who is rumored to 
have actually attained enlightenment: the Buddha, Siddhartha Gotama, or simply Gotama as 
he is called in the novel. At Gotama’s encampment, they hear his worldview firsthand, 
specifically his teaching of the way to nirvana, the spiritual release from worldly existence 
and its sufferings. While Govinda is swayed to join the ranks of the Buddhists, Siddhartha 
realizes that he can never attain salvation by submitting himself to the teaching of another – a 
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complaint he addresses to Gotama directly – and departs to a nearby city. Here he begins an 
affair with a courtesan, Kamala, and lives extravagantly as a merchant. After many years of 
stagnant, unfulfilling city life, however, he is driven to despair and attempts to drown himself 
in a river. He survives and decides to continue living, settling down near the same river 
alongside a humble but enlightened boatman, Vasudeva. Some years later, Kamala, travelling 
with her and Siddhartha’s son, is bitten by a poisonous snake near Siddhartha and Vasudeva’s 
home. She dies in their care, and Siddhartha takes in his son, only to suffer terrible grief when 
the young boy runs away back to the city. Eventually, Siddhartha has an ecstatic spiritual 
vision while gazing into the river, at which point he overcomes his grief and attains 
enlightenment. In the final chapter, Govinda and Siddhartha, now old men, cross paths one 
last time, and Siddhartha attempts to explain his enlightened worldview to Govinda, namely, 
his radical love for and affirmation of worldly existence. Govinda is unable to understand 
Siddhartha’s teaching, which so clearly contradicts that of Gotama, and the novel ends as 
Siddhartha grants Govinda an ecstatic vision similar to the one which led him to 
enlightenment.    
Indeed, in Siddhartha, the Schopenhauerian and Nietzschean worldviews are each 
represented by a figure named Siddhartha. There is, at one pole, Siddhartha Gotama, the 
Buddha, who teaches his followers to flee from the world and seek nirvana, the final state of 
otherworldly bliss and the cessation of rebirth. At the other pole, there is Siddhartha the 
protagonist, who turns his back on the Buddha and presents an opposing doctrine of 
unqualified love for the world – and even, as we will see, the desire to be reborn into it. 
Ironically, then, the very title, Siddhartha, seems to signify an irreconcilable antithesis 
inherent to the work itself. 
However, Siddhartha stands in defiance of such a Simmelian reading. For the novel 
does not merely let this antithesis stand, but seeks to reconcile the worldviews of the two 
11 
Siddharthas. Specifically, Siddhartha Gotama and Siddhartha the protagonist are united by 
the symbol of the smile, which signifies an attitude to which Hesse grants more importance 
than their expressed opinions concerning the value of life and world. In Hesse’s terminology, 
this attitude is sich fallen lassen, letting oneself fall, by which is meant the willingness to 
accept one’s destiny and enact it with complete authenticity. Thus Siddhartha and Gotama’s 
worldviews, though Schopenhauerian and Nietzschean in character, are not to be seen as 
irreconcilable opposites, but as equally valid and authentic expressions of a shared attitude. 
For this reason, Siddhartha can be read as an attempted reconciliation the Schopenhauerian 
and Nietzschean worldviews themselves. 
 The first two chapters of this project will present a Simmelian reading of Siddhartha, 
unearthing the Schopenhauerian and Nietzschean worldviews as represented by the figures of 
Gotama and Siddhartha, respectively. Beginning with the third chapter, we will witness how 
Siddhartha reaches beyond Simmel’s conclusion in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche by 
analyzing the smile, the objective correlative of the attitude of sich fallen lassen, as a symbol 
used to reconcile the worldviews of Siddhartha and Gotama. Here we will draw insight from 
another work by Hesse, Klein und Wagner (Klein and Wagner) (1919), in which the 
connection between sich fallen lassen and the smile is first established. In the fourth and final 
chapter, we will investigate Hesse’s development of sich fallen lassen and the symbol of the 
smile in relation to his engagement with Chinese philosophy, specifically Taoism, a tradition 









Gotama, Schopenhauer, Nirvana 
 
Wir freuen uns an Trug und Schaum, / Wir gleichen führerlosen Blinden, 
Wir suchen bang in Zeit und Raum, / Was nur im Ewigen zu finden. 
 
What are our joys? Delusions, foam. / We may as well be blind and guideless. 
We search, despairing, time and space, / For what is found in the Eternal. 
 
- Hesse, “Wir leben hin” (We Live Forth) (1907) 
 
In this chapter we will investigate what we, following Georg Simmel, will call the 
“Schopenhauerian pole” in Siddhartha. Though most of the first part of the novel deals with 
Schopenhauerian themes, we will only be observing Hesse’s portrayal of the Buddha, or as he 
is called in Siddhartha, Gotama. As we draw out the primary characteristics of both 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy and Gotama’s teaching, or Buddhism, we must keep in mind that 
we will not be discussing Buddhism per se, but only “Buddhism” as understood by Hesse. 
This will be done primarily by analyzing Gotama’s worldview as expressed in Siddhartha 
and drawing from Hesse’s letters and journals for the sake of clarification. To provide a 
foundation for our investigation, we will begin the chapter by exposing the Schopenhauerian 
roots of Hesse’s understanding of Buddhism. 
From Nietzsche to Schopenhauer to Buddhism 
As we saw above (p. 8), Hesse explains in an article for the Schopenhauer Yearbook 
that he came to the work of Schopenhauer after a period of dedication to Nietzsche.2 In this 
same article, he continues to describe how this switch to Schopenhauer is connected to his 
engagement with ancient Indian thought: 
Mit Schopenhauer begann ich mich schon in jenen Jünglingsjahren, in 
denen Nietzsche meine Hauptlektüre war, zu beschäftigen. Je mehr Nietzsche 
dann in den Hintergrund trat, desto mehr fühlte ich mich zu Schopenhauer 
hingezogen, um so mehr als ich, von ihm unabhängig, schon früh einige 
Kenntnis der indischen Philosophie bekam. 
Die spätere intensivere Beschäftigung mit indischer... Geistesart war es 
wohl, die mich abhielt, so viel Schopenhauer zu lesen, wie ich es sonst getan 
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hätte; so ist es gekommen, daß ich »Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung« zwar 
vielmals in Händen gehabt, aber doch nur ein einziges Mal ganz und 
konsequent gelesen habe. 
 
I began my engagement with Schopenhauer in those youthful years, 
during which Nietzsche composed the bulk of my reading. As Nietzsche 
moved further into the background, I felt myself more and more attracted to 
Schopenhauer, especially as I had acquired some knowledge of Indian 
philosophy early on, independent of my readings of him. 
It was my later, more intensive engagement with Indian… ways of thought 
which prevented me from reading as much Schopenhauer as I otherwise would 
have. So it came that I had The World as Will and Representation many times 
in my hands, although I only once read it fully and methodically. (GW12 
257f.) 
 
Just as it is the work of Schopenhauer that tears Hesse away from his studies of Nietzsche, it 
is his studies of Indian philosophy that eventually tear him away from Schopenhauer. 
However, there is a crucial difference between these two events. Whereas Hesse describes 
his engagements with Schopenhauer and Nietzsche as being inversions of one another, he 
describes Indian philosophy as a stand-in for Schopenhauer’s. In Simmel’s parlance, Hesse’s 
switch from Nietzsche to Schopenhauer is a motion from one pole to its opposite, while his 
later switch from Schopenhauer to Indian philosophy remains at the same pole. 
In an undated piece first published post-mortem, titled “Über mein Verhältnis zum 
geistigen Indien und China” (On My Relationship to the Spiritual India and China), Hesse 
gives a more definite time frame of his engagement with Schopenhauer and Indian 
philosophies. He writes that in his childhood, he is already exposed to objects and languages 
of India, where his parents and grandfather were missionaries. His father even has a number 
of Buddhist prayers that he translated into German and which he and young Hermann often 
read aloud (MS1 339-40). This is, however, as Hesse later recalls, a time when “es noch 
keine moderne Indologie gab, als noch keine Upanishaden etc. etc. übersetzt waren” [modern 
indology did not yet exist, nor were there translations of the Upanishads, etc., etc.] (MS 1 
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256). His childhood exposure to Indian thought, then, is primarily to its symbols and rituals; 
he has yet to develop an understanding of its esoteric meanings and motives.  
As Hesse continues to explain, it is not until about 1904, when he is twenty-seven 
years old, that a brief honeymoon with Schopenhauer’s philosophy prods him to a more 
thorough engagement with the philosophical works of ancient India.3 This begins with a 
feverish reading of Franz Hartmann’s translation of the Bhagavad Gita, which Hesse later in 
life refers to as “das erste echte indische Werk, das ich kennen lernte” [the first authentic 
Indian work, with which I acquainted myself] (MS 1 256, 340; cf. Mileck 160). As Hesse 
then moves from this first independent study of classical Indian philosophy to readings of 
Karl Eugen Neumann’s translation of the Dhamapaddam (1892), Hermann Oldenberg’s 
Buddha (1881), and later, Paul Deussen’s translation of the Upanishads (1897), it is 
primarily the pessimistic, Schopenhauerian elements that attract his attention. Hesse admits 
of this time,  
Meine damalige Philosophie war die eines erfolgreichen, aber müden und 
übersättigten Lebens, ich faßte den ganzen Buddhismus als Resignation und 
Askese auf, als Flucht in Wunschlosigkeit, und blieb Jahre dabei stehen. 
  
My philosophy at the time was that of a successful but tired and jaded life. I 
understood all of Buddhism as resignation and asceticism, as flight into 
wishlessness, and I stood by this belief for years. (MS 1 340) 
 
It is not surprising that Hesse comes to understand Indian, especially Buddhist, 
philosophy, as pessimistic and resignatory. German Indology at the turn of the twentieth 
century is still the legacy of Schopenhauer, who sees life- and world-denial as central to 
Buddhism. This tendency to resignation is just what Schopenhauer, the arch-pessimist,4 sees 
as being so noble and valuable in Indian philosophy. In opposition to Hegel, Germany’s 
philosophical titan of the early nineteenth century, who describes the denizens of India as 
ethically stagnant “vegetable people” (Halbfass 84-99), Schopenhauer places the intellectual 
and moral accomplishments of ancient Indian thinkers, specifically the Buddha, on par with – 
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sometimes even above – those of Western thinkers like Immanuel Kant or Christ5. 
Approaching the fin de siècle, as Hegel’s popularity wanes and Schopenhauer’s waxes, it is 
the latter’s now-famous words that inspire Germany’s new generation of indologists:  
Wir... schicken nunmehr den Brahmanen englische clergymen... um sie aus 
Mitleid eines bessern zu belehren… Aber uns widerfährt was Dem, der eine 
Kugel gegen einen Felsen abschießt. In Indien fassen unsere Religionen nie 
und nimmermehr Wurzel: die Urweisheit des Menschengeschlechts wird nicht 
von den Begebenheiten in Galiläa verdrängt werden. Hingegen strömt 
Indische Weisheit nach Europa zurück und wird eine Grundveränderung in 
unserm Wissen und Denken hervorbringen. 
 
We... are now sending English clergymen to the Brahmans… so that we may, 
out of pity, put them right… With this enterprise, however, we are faring just 
as well as one who fires a bullet against a cliff. Our religions will never strike 
roots in India: the primordial wisdom of mankind will not be supplanted by 
the events in Galilee. In contrast, the wisdom of India is now flowing back to 
Europe and will bring forth a fundamental change in our knowledge and 
thinking. (WWV1 §63)   
 
True to Schopenhauer’s words, the turn of the twentieth century sees missionaries 
who no longer preach, but receive and bring back to Germany the teachings of the Indian 
subcontinent. Among these is Karl Eugen Neumann, one of the most important – though now 
largely ignored – indologists of the period. After reading Schopenhauer, Neumann is inspired 
to return to the university, study Sanskrit, and translate, among other works of Buddhist 
scripture, the Dhamapaddam (1892) and the Reden des Gotomo Buddho (Discourses of the 
Buddha) (1895-1901), a collection of medium-length discourses given by the Buddha 
(Marchand, 344f). Both works have a profound effect on Hesse’s understanding of 
Buddhism, and Hesse produces several positive reviews of Neumann’s Discourses at the time 
he is composing Siddhartha (MS1 40, 147-48). 
There is good reason to regard Neumann’s translations as a deliberate attempt to 
strengthen the relationship between Schopenhauer’s philosophy and Buddhism. For instance, 
to make the unfamiliar teachings of the Buddha sound more familiar and reasonable to a 
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German audience, Neumann makes frequent reference to the philosophy and terminology of 
Schopenhauer in the explanatory notes. In the primary text, too, he borrows Schopenhauer’s 
most fundamental and peculiar terminology: Bejahung und Verneinung des Willens 
(affirmation and denial of the will). For instance, in the “Elephantenspur” (Traces of the 
Elephant), the eighth discourse of the first volume of the Mittlere Sammlung (Middle Length 
Discourses), Neumann twice renders the Buddha as saying,  
Was… Wille, Vergnügen, Bejahung, Behagen ist, das ist die 
Leidensentwicklung; was… Verneinung des Willensreizes, Verleugnung des 
Willensreizes ist, das ist die Leidensauflösung 
 
What… will, enjoyment, affirmation, and pleasure is, that is the evolution of 
suffering; what… denial of the stimulation of the will, renunciation of the 
stimulation of the will is, that is the solution to suffering. (RB 213) 
 
Most revealing of all, however, Neumann concludes his preface to the first volume with the 
statement that “Die Reden stammen zwar aus dem 6. Jahrhundert vor Christus: aber sie 
machen zuweilen den Eindruck als gehörten sie ins 6. Jahrhundert nach Schopenhauer” [To 
be sure, the discourses are from the sixth century before Christ; however, at times they make 
the impression that they belong to the sixth century after Schopenhauer] (RB XXXII). 
In Eine Bibliothek der Weltliteratur (A Library of World Literature) (1929), a book of 
simultaneous autobiography and kaleidoscopic literary review, Hesse gives a clear image of 
his dedication to Neumann’s translations. He writes, 
Es waren… die Übersetzungen indischer Quellen, die ich auftreiben konnte, 
beinahe alle sehr mangelhaft, einzig Deußens »Sechzig Upanishaden« und 
Neumanns deutsche »Reden Buddhas« gaben mir einen reinen, vollen 
Geschmack und Genuß der indischen Quellen. 
 
Almost all of the translations of Indian sources that I could get my hands on 
were quite poor. Only Deussen’s Sixty Upanishads and Neumann’s Discourses 
of the Buddha gave me a full, undiluted taste and appreciation of the Indian 
world. (GS7 338-39) 
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Just how “undiluted” Hesse’s sources are is a question that will not be resolved in the present 
work, as any answer would necessitate a long and rigorous comparison of the German 
translations with the original Pali texts. Nonetheless, it is Neumann, an orientalist who sees 
himself contributing to the legacy of Schopenhauer, who provides Hesse with the first 
translations of Buddhist texts that Hesse judges to be authentic. Considering that Hesse is 
drawn to Neumann’s translations directly after his primary engagement with the philosophy 
of Schopenhauer, there is good reason to believe that what he enjoys in the translations, 
consciously or unconsciously, is their Schopenhauerian quality.  
In the remainder of this chapter, we will observe Hesse’s own portrayal of the Buddha 
in Siddhartha. To distinguish the latter from the historical Buddha, we will, following Hesse, 
refer to him as Gotama. As we will see, Gotama’s worldview is in many respects identical 
with Schopenhauer’s, and can be taken as the crystallization of Hesse’s Schopenhauerian 
understanding of Buddhist thought.  
Gotama and Schopenhauer on the Nature of the World 
We will begin with the most fundamental similarity between Gotama and 
Schopenhauer: their ontological beliefs, that is, their beliefs about the nature of the world, 
both its happenings and its inhabitants. Both Schopenhauer and Gotama begin from a 
deterministic understanding of the universe. They consider all events to be subjected to an 
omnipresent and unrelenting law of causality that determines the entire course of world-
events. For this reason, each one in turn describes the world as “eine ewige Kette von 
Ursachen und Wirkungen” [an eternal chain of causes and effects] (WWV 1 §7, PP 1 216, 
SvG §20; cf. GD3 641).6 There is – with the one important exception of final spiritual 
salvation, which will be addressed below – no Lucretian “swerve” to atoms, nor any notion of 
free will, divine intervention, or pure chance that could give rise to an undetermined event. 
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Everything that occurs, cognitive or physical, happens as it does because it must, because it is 
part of the never-ending chain of causes and effects.  
 Granted, Schopenhauer and Gotama reach this conclusion from different paths. 
Schopenhauer, following his reading of Immanuel Kant, is a transcendental idealist. In other 
words, he believes that the external world is a “representation” (Vorstellung7) of the world 
constructed by our minds. What this means is that our minds, on receiving data from 
stimulated sensory organs, uses a priori, or innate, cognitive laws to rework this same data 
into objects of perception. Specifically, according to Schopenhauer’s slimmed-down version 
of Kant’s epistemological schema, there are three such a priori cognitive laws: time, space, 
and causality (the latter being the combined working of the former two).8 The entire natural 
world we perceive, then, has already been reworked by these laws, and therefore necessarily 
takes the form of a causally-linked series of occurrences in space and time. This is, in 
Schopenhauer’s terms, die Welt als Vorstellung, the world as representation. The latter has no 
truth in itself; it is filled with nothing but “mere appearances” (bloße Erscheinungen) (WWV1 
§3).9 
Though Gotama is not as clear as Schopenhauer with regard to the source of 
determinism, the determinate nature of the world also serves as the cornerstone of his 
worldview. In Siddhartha’s words, as he speaks to Gotama,  
Als eine vollkommene, als eine nie und nirgends unterbrochene Kette zeigst du 
die Welt, als eine ewige Kette, gefügt aus Ursachen und Wirkungen. Niemals 
ist dies so klar gesehen, nie so unwiderleglich dargestellt worden.  
 
You describe the world as a perfect chain that is never and nowhere 
interrupted, an eternal chain made of causes and effects. Never has this been so 
clearly seen, never so irrefutably established. (GD3 641) 
 
Siddhartha continues to note what he sees as Gotama’s most important teaching:  
die Einheit der Welt, der Zusammenhang alles Geschehens, das 
Umschlossensein alles Großen und Kleinen vom selben Strome, vom selben 
Gesetz der Ursachen, des Werdens und Sterbens  
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the unity of the world, the connection of all events, the enclosure of everything 
big and small by the same stream, by the same law of causes, of becoming and 
dying. (GD3 641-42) 
 
Siddhartha’s repeated emphasis on Gotama’s notion of the causal interconnection of events 
shows us that Gotama, like Schopenhauer, has set up the law of causality as a central tenet of 
Buddhism.  
The Need for Salvation 
 
For both Schopenhauer and Gotama, the doctrine of determinism is not an end in 
itself, but serves as a means to explaining the nature of our experience, and specifically, our 
experience of suffering. In Gotama’s teaching, suffering arises from the fact that the causally 
determined world in which we live is permeated with impermanence. Indeed, impermanence 
and the law of causality are two sides of the same coin. An event can only be caused when a 
previous event has caused it, and in doing so, passes away. Certainly this is the case in 
Siddhartha, as Siddhartha refers to Gotama’s “Gesetz der Ursachen, des Werdens und des 
Sterbens” [law of causes, of becoming and dying] (GD3 642). Siddhartha is not referring to 
two distinct laws; as is clear from his use of grammatical apposition, Siddhartha is construing 
the same law in two different ways. That is to say, Gotama’s “law of causes” simply is the 
“law of becoming and dying.”  
Because the world and the things within it are subject to the law of causality and thus 
impermanent, if we attach ourselves to these things, believing we should possess them 
permanently, we will only cause our own suffering. This is the ground for the first Noble 
Truth of Buddhism, the Noble Truth of Dukkha (Suffering), or as Gotama refers to it in 
Siddhartha, “die Lehre vom Leiden” [the doctrine of suffering] (GD3 638). Its basic principle 
is that the things of the world do not lead to ultimate satisfaction, but rather to continued 
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suffering. Or, as Gotama puts it, “Leiden war das Leben, voll Leid war die Welt” [Life was 
suffering, the world was full of suffering] (GD3 638; cf. Spiro 37).10  
The second Noble Truth of Buddhism, which Gotama calls “die Lehre… von der 
Herkunft des Leidens [the doctrine of the source of suffering] (GD3 638), has to do with the 
explicit cause of suffering. The historical Buddha names the latter tanha, or “thirsting,” 
which is roughly equatable with the concepts of craving, desire, or wanting (Spiro 38; 
Panaїoti 133ff).11 Thirsting, in other words, designates a particular disposition of the subject 
toward the objects of the world, namely the desire to possess objects or enter into situations 
which lead to pleasure, as well as the desire to avoid objects and situations which lead to 
suffering. Yet, according to the first Noble Truth, the permanent satisfaction of thirsting or 
desire is impossible, as even pleasurable situations and objects pass away of necessity.  
In anticipation of the objection that thirsting, and thus suffering, will simply come to 
an end after the death of the individual, the historical Buddha introduces a caveat: attachment 
and thirsting, unless permanently extinguished during one’s life, lead to rebirth, as the subject 
still desires existence as such (Spiro 42). Those individuals who still thirst after life become 
caught up in samsara, the cycle of rebirth, repeatedly entering the world and undergoing the 
sufferings inherent to life. For Buddhism proper, there is simply no argument as to whether 
remaining in samsara might be desirable. The notion that pain is an evil is simply axiomatic 
(ibid. 39), meaning that the only conceivable goal is the cessation of suffering. This would, in 
turn, entail the escape from samsara and the end of rebirth. 
The third Noble Truth of Buddhism, which Gotama calls “die Lehre vom Weg zur 
Aufhebung des Leidens” [the doctrine of the way to the negation of suffering] (GD3 638), is 
that there is a way out of samsara. This way out is, quite logically, the cessation of thirsting. 
The attainment of a thirstless state is nirvana, or as Gotama sometimes refers to it, salvation 
(Erlösung) (GD3 638). In the words of Hesse’s contemporary, Albert Schweitzer, nirvana is 
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“das innerliche Losgelöst-Sein von den Dingen [der Welt]” [the inner detachment from the 
things [of the world]] (Weltanschauung 96). This is indeed a sentiment that Gotama shares. 
As Govinda, Siddhartha’s lifelong friend who has converted to Buddhism, says, Gotama 
“verbot uns, unser Herz in Liebe an Irdisches zu fesseln” [forbid us to shackle our hearts with 
love to worldly things] (GD3 729). Furthermore, as Siddhartha and Govinda first see Gotama, 
they recognize him immediately “an der Vollkommenheit seiner Ruhe, an der Stille seiner 
Gestalt, in welcher kein Wollen… war, nur Licht und Frieden” [by the perfection of his 
serenity, by his tranquil figure, in which there was no wanting... only light and peace] (638). 
That is, Gotama has extinguished his wanting or thirst, and thereby attained the highest state 
of serenity, or nirvana.  
Buddhists who have attained nirvana, then, are detached from the world and no 
longer desire its objects. Nor do they desire life as such, which frees them from the cycle of 
rebirth. According to the legend of Gotama as presented in Siddhartha:   
Einer sei erschienen, Gotama genannt, der Erhabene, der Buddha, der habe in sich 
das Leid der Welt überwunden und das Rad der Wiedergeburten zum Stehen 
gebracht… er hatte Nirwana erreicht und kehrte nie mehr in den Kreislauf zurück, 
tauchte nie mehr in den trüben Strom der Gestaltungen unter.  
 
A man had appeared named Gotama, the Sublime One, the Buddha. It was said 
that he had overcome the pain of the world and halted the wheel of life.12 ...He 
had attained nirvana and would never again return into the lifecycle; never again 
would he dive into the murky stream of forms. (GD3 631-32) 
 
Gotama’s halting of the wheel of life, or the cycle of rebirth, is indeed the kernel of nirvana 
as understood by Hesse. In a journal entry from the time of Siddhartha, he refers to “das 
echte Niwana” [the true nirvana] as “Das Nichtmehrgeborenwerden” [release from birth] 
(MS1 11). Again, Hesse writes in a letter from 1930: “...Das, worum Buddha sich in seinen 
Hunderten von Predigten bemüht hat, ist… eine neue Lehre von der Erlösung aus der ewigen 
Wiederkehr, vom Weg zu Nirvana” [What the Buddha strove to establish in his hundreds of 
sermons is a new teaching of the salvation from the eternal return, of the way to nirvana] 
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(MS1 210). That such a state of nirvana can be attained by adhering to the Buddha’s teaching 
is the fourth and final Noble Truth of Buddhism. Gotama states it so: “Leiden war das Leben, 
voll Leid war die Welt, aber Erlösung war gefunden: Erlösung fand, wer den Weg des 
Buddha ging” [Life was suffering, the world was full of pain, but salvation [Erlösung] had 
been found: he found salvation who went the Buddha’s way] (GD3 638).  
The Buddha’s way is specifically the practice of the Noble Eightfold Path, which, 
following Neumann’s translation, are: “rechte Erkenntnis, rechte Gesinnung, rechte Rede, 
rechtes Handeln, rechtes Wandeln, rechtes Mühn, rechte Einsicht… rechte Vertiefung” [right 
knowledge, right disposition, right speech, right action, right way of life, right effort, right 
discernment… right meditation] (R 877). Recalling from above (p. 16) that the Buddha, in 
Neumann’s translation, also explains that “what… denial of the stimulation of the will, 
renunciation of the stimulation of the will is, that is the solution to suffering,” it would seem 
that the Noble Eightfold is directed toward cultivating virtues which quiet the will. All of 
these virtues, however, can also be interpreted as eudaemonic virtues, that is, virtues which 
lead toward personal well-being in the world. The latter interpretation would, in turn, 
undermine the claim that the Buddhist worldview is ultimately life- and world-denying. 
While this view is held by modern interpreters (e.g., Panaïoti 161ff), we must remember that 
we are attempting to piece together Hesse’s view of Buddhism, which is influenced by the 
legacy of Schopenhauer, who establishes Buddhism as a life- and world-denying religion. 
Keeping this in mind, we will now turn back to Schopenhauer to draw out the central 
similarities between his worldview and Gotama’s. 
According to Schopenhauer, the entire world as representation is underlain by a 
transcendent Will (Wille),13 whose only function is to strive endlessly toward existence 
(Dasein) (WWV2 §28, p. 523). Schopenhauer even sees the Will as analogous to thirsting; he 
writes,“Wollen und Streben ist sein ganzes Wesen, einem unlöschbaren Durst gänzlich zu 
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vergleichen” [Wanting and striving is its entire essence, entirely comparable to an 
unquenchable thirst] (WWV 1 §57). The Will, then, is an extreme version of the Buddhist 
notion of thirsting; whereas in Buddhism thirsting is a psychological state, Schopenhauer’s 
Will is the ontological principle of the universe (cf. Panaïoti 160).14 Everything in the world, 
according to Schopenhauer, is a manifestation of the Will, from natural forces such as gravity 
and magnetism all the way up to the level of organic creatures. Organic creatures, however, 
do not merely exist, but live. Accordingly, Schopenhauer refers to this highest stage of the 
Will’s manifestation as the Will to Live (Wille zum Leben15) (WWV2 §28).  
It is just at the point where the Will becomes the Will to Live that suffering enters the 
scene. For living creatures are not insensitive like stones, but have subjective experience of 
the world and central nervous systems hardwired to feel pain. And the world is full of 
opportunities to do just that. Not only do animals tear each other apart in the quest for 
sustenance – or as Schopenhauer puts it, “Der Wille [muß] an sich selber zehren… weil außer 
ihm nichts daist und er ein hungriger Wille ist” [The Will must feast on itself, for it is all that 
exists, and it is a hungry Will] (WWV §28)16 – but more importantly, any sense of creaturely 
satisfaction is necessarily fleeting. For the things of the world, being subject to the a priori 
cognitive law of time, are by their very nature temporal and transitory. The life of the Will in 
the world, Schopenhauer writes, is for this reason nothing but “das stete Haschen nach immer 
andern Truggestalten” [the continuous chase after ever-changing illusions] (WWV 1 §57). 
Indeed, we can read this as a combination of Gotama’s first two Noble Truths: suffering is 
caused by desire, and specifically, the desire for transient phenomena.  
Though the Will to Live, according to Schopenhauer, is itself the source of suffering, 
most creatures – including humans – do not realize this fact. They remain slaves to the Will, 
striving after the impermanent satisfaction of creaturely urges, continuing to do the things 
that are conducive to self-preservation and procreation. In this way, the Will to Live 
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preserves itself in the world, and the cycle of life and suffering continues. Indeed, 
Schopenhauer even believes that the Will to Live – or at least the individual’s specific will*, 
which he terms the “character” (Charakter) – is passed from parent (specifically father17) to 
child, meaning that the will of the individual is literally reborn into the world as a result of 
procreation (WWV2 §43). The idea is quite similar to Gotama’s notion of samsara, according 
to which desire, specifically the desire for continued existence, leads to the rebirth and 
continued suffering of the individual. This similarity is not lost on Schopenhauer, as he 
himself equates the continuance of the personal will with “Sansara” [samsara] (WWV2 §48).   
 Schopenhauer further believes that at the highest stage of the Will’s manifestation in 
the world – that is, at the level of humans – the intellect can become so powerful that 
individuals recognize the world for what it really is: an endless slaughter-bench and an 
eternal spring of misery, all in the service of the Will to Live. In Schopenhauer’s terms, these 
individuals see through the principium individuationis – the combined working of space and 
time that splinters the transcendent Will into separate bodies – and realize that all the things 
of the world, including themselves, are manifestations of the same Will (WWV 1 §66). They 
see that the entire world as representation, as samsara, is nothing but the reflection of the 
ruthless, hungry Will in space and time. At this moment, they face the moral problem par 
excellence: to be or not to be? In full knowledge of what they, as members of the world, are 
essentially – that is, Will to Live – they must choose to either continue affirming life and 
world, or to turn away from the world and deny their wills.  
 As Schopenhauer believes that affirming the personal will can only lead to the 
continuance of life and suffering, he reasons that individual salvation (Erlösung) is to be 
attained through the denial of the will. Schopenhauer’s practical philosophy, reminiscent of 
the Eightfold Path of Buddhism, therefore sets up those actions as virtuous which serve to 
                                               
* I use the lowercase “will” to refer to the specific will of the individual, which is, according to Schopenhauer’s 
hereditary theory, a sliver or aspect of the transcendent Will to Live. 
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quiet the will and stymie egoistic tendencies. This includes, most importantly, denying the 
desire for procreation, meaning that, for will-denying individuals, the cycle of rebirth comes 
to a close. Freed from their attachment to the world, to samsara, all that remains for such 
world- and will-deniers – whom Schopenhauer terms “saints” (Heiliger) – is salvation 
(Erlösung), the highest and only lasting state of peace (Ruhe). Schopenhauer himself notes 
the similarity between this idea and the Buddhist conception of nirvana (WWV1 §48, p. 781), 
even ending his World as Will and Representation with a tip of the hat to the latter.18  
Schopenhauer is not alone in comparing his theory of salvation with the Buddhist 
concept of nirvana. In a journal entry from February 17, 1921, Hesse himself describes 
nirvana in unabashedly Schopenhauerian terms. He writes, “Nirwana ist, wie ich es verstehe, 
das Zurückkehren des Einzelnen zum ungeteilten Gaznen, der erlösende Schritt hinter das 
prinzipium [sic] individuationis” [Nirvana is, as I understand it, the reverting19 of the 
individual to the undivided whole, the salvific step behind the principium individuationis] 
(MS1 21). As this entry dates from about two weeks after he completes the chapter “Gotama” 
(MS1 39), in which the Buddhist worldview is most clearly exposited, it is plain to see that 
Hesse has Schopenhauer on his mind at the exact time he is shaping his own image of the 
Buddha. In this same journal entry, however, Hesse also expresses his reserves about the 
Schopenhauerian-Buddhist goal of nirvana. He writes, “Eine andere Frage ist es, ob man 
diese Rückkehr behegren soll oder nicht, ob man es auf dem Wege Buddhas tun soll oder 
nicht” [It is another question if one ought to desire this reversion or not, if one should go the 
way of the Buddha or not] (ibid.). As we will see in the next chapter, Hesse attempts to 
answer this question by presenting an opposing, world-affirming – in other words, 





 Siddhartha, Nietzsche, Amor Fati 
 
Verlaß mich du, unholder Traum / Vom Leid der Welt! 
 
Please let me be, unpleasant dream / Of this world’s pain! 
 
- Hesse,“Im Grase Liegend” (Lying in the Grass) (1914) 
 
That two opposing worldviews can be reconciled implies that their opposition is 
understood. For this reason, we need to understand why exactly the two Siddharthas 
(Siddhartha and Siddhartha Gotama) are to be taken as representatives of opposite 
worldviews. This will be done by showing that Siddhartha’s worldview is comparable to that 
of Nietzsche’s, and as such, opposite to Gotama’s Schopenhauerian worldview. Most 
importantly, we will see that Siddhartha embraces an attitude that Nietzsche calls amor fati, 
that is, the love of fate, and specifically, the love of one’s fate as a creature in a world filled 
with suffering. Amor fati, in turn, is Nietzsche’s own inversion and denial of Schopenhauer’s 
goal of salvation (Erlösung), which, as we have seen, is equatable with Gotama’s goal of 
nirvana. 
Siddhartha, Zarathustra, and the Goal 
 
In August 1920, Hesse’s work on Siddhartha comes to a halt. He has by this point 
written everything up to the fourth chapter, in which Siddhartha refuses to submit himself to 
the teaching of Gotama and experiences his first “awakening” (Erwachen). Like Siddhartha, 
Hesse feels that he is still missing the proper source of personal experience he needs to move 
forward with his task (MS1 10). He has certainly been able to paint a vivid portrait of 
“Siddhartha dem Dulder und Asketen” [Siddhartha the endurer and ascetic], but this is only 
because he is familiar with the tendency to world-renunciation that characterizes this period 
of Siddhartha’s life. At the age of thirty, Hesse even practices his own non-ecclesiastical form 
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of Buddhism (MS1 202). Almost fifteen years later, as Hesse takes his major break from 
writing Siddhartha, his friend Romain Rolland describes him as  
hager, hohlwängig, …asketisch, hart aus Knochen geschnitzt… Er hat sich 
sogar fast von allem, was dem Leben eines modernen Menschen Wert gibt, 
vom Wohlsein, von der Beteiligung am Kulturbetrieb, losgelöst. Er lebt wie 
ein Weiser aus Indien. 
 
haggard, hollow-cheeked, …ascetic, carved out of bone… He has almost 
completely detached himself from everything that gives value to the life of the 
modern person: from wellbeing, from active participation in cultural pursuits. 
He lives like an Indian sage. (MS1 115) 
 
It is not surprising that Hesse is at a loss when it comes time to portray “Siddhartha den 
Sieger, den Jasager, den Bezwinger” [Siddhartha the victor, the yes-sayer, the conqueror] 
(MS1 10) – or, to conclude his list of unabashed Nietzschean borrowings,20 Siddhartha the 
Übermensch*. He certainly wants his protagonist to embody a life-affirming, Nietzschean 
ideal, but he still lacks the experiential source to bring this new side of Siddhartha to life.  
Ironically, considering that Hesse chooses to subtitle Siddhartha “eine indische 
Dichtung” [an Indian tale], he intends for the final sections to present a distinctly anti-Indian 
– and as we will see, anti-Schopenhauerian – worldview. Hesse even comes to refer to 
Siddhartha as “der Ausdruck meiner Befreiung vom indischen Denken” [the expression of 
my emancipation from Indian thought] (MS1 202), by which he specifically means 
Buddhism, or at least, his Schopenhauerian interpretation of Buddhism as “resignation and 
asceticism, as flight into wishlessness” (above, p. 14). That Siddhartha borrows heavily from 
the symbolic world of India should not lead the reader into thinking otherwise, as Hesse 
himself writes to his friend, Stefan Zweig,  
Daß [meine Religion] im Siddhartha noch indisch gekleidet geht, heißt nicht, 
daß das Indische daran mir noch wichtig sei, aber erst, als eben dies Indische 
anfing, mir nicht wichtig zu sein, wurde es für mich darstellbar. 
                                               
* Rather than using the gendered “overman” or awkward “overhuman,” I will use the German Übermensch. 
Accordingly, the plural is “the Übermenschen.” 
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That [my religion] in Siddhartha is still in Indian garb doesn’t mean that the 
Indian aspect in the book is still important to me. Rather, it was just as this 
same Indian aspect stopped being important to me that I was able to portray it. 
(MS1 190; Weber 79) 
 
Siddhartha the protagonist, however, does not merely embody the negation of 
Gotama’s Schopenhauerian worldview. He is as well the expression of a new goal that, Hesse 
wants to show, is both positively expressible and ultimately attainable. In order to clarify this, 
Hesse uses a unique narrative tactic in a pair of passages toward the end of the novel. 
Typically, the narrator of Siddhartha reports on what Siddhartha did or thought, but at two 
points in the penultimate chapter “Om,” the narrator steps out of his otherwise limited role in 
order to make prescient claims about Siddhartha’s goal, both its content and its attainability. 
Opening the chapter, the narrator says, “Obwohl er nahe der Vollendung war, und an seiner 
letzten Wunde trug” [Although he was close to perfection and bore his last wound] (GD3 
715), which gives us a closer taste of what is to come, namely, a state of perfection. Further 
into the chapter, our vision of Siddhartha’s approaching perfection becomes even more clear:  
“Ach, noch blühte die Wunde nicht, noch wehrte sein Herz sich wider das Schicksal, noch 
strahlte nicht Heiterkeit und Sieg aus seinem Leide” [Alas, the wound had not yet bloomed, 
his heart still resisted his fate, serenity and triumph did not yet shine forth from his pain] 
(717). By telling us what Siddhartha is not yet – perfect, accepting of fate, healed – the 
narrator slyly dangles before us the information we need to make sense of Siddhartha’s 
ecstatic vision later on in the chapter. We are led to understand that the latter is not a mere 
illusion, mirage, or just another step along a never-ending path. Rather, Siddhartha attains the 
final goal, which the narrator confirms for us by ending the chapter with the actualization of 
his previously prescient claim: “In dieser Stunde hörte Siddhartha auf, mit dem Schicksal zu 
kämpfen, hörte auf zu leiden” [In this hour, Siddhartha ceased to battle with his fate, he 
ceased to suffer] (GD3 721). The narrator confirms that Siddhartha’s vision is the 
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transformative event of his life, the moment when he reaches a state of perfection 
(Vollendung). This is, in the language of Siddhartha, “seines langen Suchens Ziel” [his long 
searching’s goal].  
The word “goal” (Ziel) is not just limited to this passage, but appears in every chapter. 
Indeed, every chapter is the description of Siddhartha’s release from an old goal or discovery 
of a new goal, oftentimes both. In contrast with Siddhartha’s previous goals, however, his 
ecstatic vision at the end of “Om,” or more precisely, the new understanding of the world to 
which this vision leads him, is established as the goal. Linguistically, this is made clear by the 
peculiar construction of the phrase seines langen Suchens Ziel (his long searching’s goal). 
The construction is more typical of poetic or archaic texts, which, granted, is befitting of the 
general tone of the novel. What is most important, however, is that the use of this more poetic 
construction places emphasis on the word “goal” (Ziel). The phrase draws attention to itself 
and makes its intention clear: like an arrow racing towards its target, “seines langen Suchens” 
is aimed to strike das Ziel. 
Already, this narrative focus on Siddhartha’s “langen Suchens Ziel” brings us into the 
world of Nietzsche. In Nietzsche’s Also sprach Zarathustra (Thus Spoke Zarathustra) (1883), 
which Hesse reads and admires (cf. MD1 150), Zarathustra fervently addresses the concept of 
das Ziel. For instance, in one of the concluding sections of the first book, “Vom tausend und 
einem Ziele” [On the Thousand and One Goals], we see Zarathustra lay out the kernel of the 
idea:  
Tausend Ziele gab es bisher, denn tausend Völker gab es. Nur die Fessel der 
tausend Nacken fehlt noch, es fehlt das eine Ziel. Noch hat die Menschheit 
kein Ziel  
 
Until now there were a thousand goals, because there were a thousand peoples. 
Now just the shackle of the thousand necks is lacking, all that is lacking is the 
one goal. Humanity still has no goal.  
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Though the positive content of Zarathustra’s goal is not made clear in this passage, both the 
language and the title suggest that the furthering of humanity is dependent on a single 
unifying goal. This goal, as becomes clear throughout the work, is Nietzsche’s infamous 
Übermensch (cf. Z “Vorrede” [Preface] §§4-5).  
If Hesse’s abundant use of the word “goal” is coming directly from his reading of 
Nietzsche, specifically Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, then Siddhartha’s “langen Suchens Ziel” is 
to be read as a solution to Zarathustra’s problem of the missing goal. Siddhartha himself 
would then be Hesse’s own portrait of the Nietzschean Übermensch. As further confirmation 
of this claim, we will need to determine if there are genuine correspondences between 
Siddhartha’s and Nietzsche’s goals. To do this, we will begin by analyzing Nietzsche’s goal 
of the Übermensch, especially its relation to and inversion of Schopenhauer’s ideal of the 
saint. This will provide us with the groundwork we need to dissect Siddhartha’s goal and 
demonstrate its relation to Nietzsche’s. 
Nietzsche’s Anti-Schopenhauerian Goal:  
The Übermensch and the Affirmation of Eternal Return 
 
In opposition to the Schopenhauerian saint, who renounces self-motivated willing in 
order to be freed from suffering, the Nietzschean Übermensch embraces suffering as the most 
potent stimulus to continue living. It would be a mistake, however, to think Nietzsche refutes 
Schopenhauer’s pessimistic recognition of the overwhelming presence of suffering in the 
world. Far from dismissing pessimism as a whole, Nietzsche envisions a new ideal of a 
“Dionysian pessimism,” which maintains gratitude and love for the world (FW §370; 
Dienstag 161-200). Nietzsche opposes this form of pessimism to the “Romantic pessimism” 
of Schopenhauer, which is born of hatred for and denial of the state of the world. Romantic 
pessimists like Schopenhauer shape their image of the world according to their own onerous 
existence, and are thus lead to conclude that the world is itself a hellish place that ought to be 
destroyed. As the kernel of this attitude, we see Schopenhauer proclaim, “Als Zweck unsers 
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Daseins ist in der Tat nicht anderes anzugeben, als die Erkenntnis, daß wir besser nicht 
dawären” [Indeed, we can boast no other purpose for our existence than the realization that 
we would be better off if we did not exist] (WWV2 §48). Dionysian pessimists, on the other 
hand, do not place their faith in a world of eternal peace and painlessness somewhere beyond 
the world in which they live. Rather, they desire to enhance and aid the world, to give 
expression to their “übervollen, zukunftsschwangeren Kraft” [overflowing strength, pregnant 
with the future] (FW §370). As Zarathustra would say, they remain “der Erde treu” [faithful 
to the earth] (“Vorrede” §3).  
Because Nietzsche interprets Schopenhauer’s response to suffering as a symptom of 
weakness, he seeks to turn it on its head (FW §370; cf. Panaïoti 76ff., 105f.). Following 
Nietzsche, suffering is not something that ought to be radically eliminated. Rather, it must be 
reinterpreted as the most potent stimulus to life and its expansion (cf. JGB §225). A healthy 
dose of Dionysian pessimism, then, far from quieting the will, “paves the way to life-
affirmation” (Panaïoti 105).21 Indeed, to truly affirm life means to recognize, accept, and 
cherish every single instance of suffering as something that has potentiated the present 
moment. As Zarathustra says, “Sagtet ihr ja zu einer Lust? …So sagtet ihr ja auch zu allem 
Wehe. Alle Dinge sind verkettet, verfädelt” [Have you ever said yes to a single pleasure? 
…Then you have also said yes to every pain. Everything is interlinked, intertwined] (“Das 
trunkne Lied” [The Drunken Song] §10). 
Nietzsche’s idea that the affirmation of life necessitates the affirmation of suffering is 
closely related to one of his most important and characteristic thought experiments: the 
eternal return (ewige Wiederkunft/Wiederkehr). The latter, which Nietzsche calls in Ecce 
Homo “die höchste Formel der Bejahung, der erreicht werden kann” [the highest formula for 
affirmation that can be achieved] (EH “Zarathustra” §1), is first presented in the penultimate 
aphorism of the first edition of Die fröhliche Wissenschaft [The Gay Science] (1882).22 
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Suppose, Nietzsche writes, an all-knowing demon were to inform you that everything you 
have experienced – every pain, every joy, every mundane moment and triumph – must repeat 
itself for all eternity precisely as it has already occurred. Nietzsche’s question is: who could 
possibly rejoice at such a thought? His answer: only the Übermensch, who at every moment 
affirms the question: “Willst du diess noch einmal und noch unzählige Male?” [Do you want 
this again and uncountable times thereafter?] (FW §341).23  
The affirmation of the eternal return characteristic of the Übermensch is, then, to be 
taken as Nietzsche’s answer to Schopenhauer’s “Romantic pessimism” and its corresponding 
ideal of the saintly denial of the Will to Live. For Schopenhauer, saints deny the Will to Live 
because they have recognized that the continued striving toward life is the ultimate source of 
suffering. Nietzsche turns this idea on its head and presents the greatest humans as those who 
are able to affirm – to will with all their power – the eternal return of life and all of the 
sufferings that make it possible, because they will life absolutely.24 In Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche, Georg Simmel nicely summarizes this antithesis between Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche, writing, “Wie Schopenhauer nur einen einzigen absoluten Wert kennt: Nicht-
Leben – so kennt Nietzsche gleichfalls nur einen: Leben” [As Schopenhauer knows only one 
absolute value: not living – Nietzsche, as well, knows only one: life] (348). 
Not only is Nietzsche’s idea of the affirmation of the eternal return an inversion of 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the denial of the Will to Live, but as he implies in a stunning 
passage from Jenseits von Gut und Böse [Beyond Good and Evil], it is as well an inversion of 
the equivalent Buddhist doctrine of nirvana (§56). Both Buddhism and Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy, according to Nietzsche, are expressions of the same urge to flee from a world 
filled with suffering. The goal of nirvana, then, lures people “ins Nichts” [into nothingness] 
(ibid.), that is, to the desire for an imaginary Real World (wahre Welt) which supposedly 
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exists “beyond,” “behind,” and in direct opposition to the world of becoming (G-D 
“Geschichte eines Irrtums” [History of an Error]).  
According to Nietzsche, there is only one type of person who recognizes the danger of 
“Romantic,” life-denying pessimism – whether in its Schopenhauerian or Buddhist form – 
and become attuned to “das umgekehrte Ideal” [the inverted ideal] (JGB §56). This, 
Nietzsche makes immediately clear in Beyond Good and Evil, is the Übermensch, who is 
de[r] übermüthigste lebendigste und weltbejahendste Menschen, der sich nicht 
nur mit dem, was war und ist, abgefunden und vertragen gelernt hat, sondern 
es, so wie es war und ist, wieder haben will, in alle Ewigkeit hinaus  
 
the highest-spirited, liveliest, and most world-affirming human, who has not 
simply learned to come to terms with himself and tolerate what was and is, but 
wants to have it all again, just as it was and is, for all eternity. (§56)  
 
For the Übermenschen, there is no Real World for which they can or ought to strive, because 
they do not believe that the world in which they live is false or illusory (G-D “Geschichte 
eines Irrtums”). All that is real is the actual, impermanent, and ever-changing world that we 
inhabit, the world of becoming. 
The affirmation of the eternal return, the opposite of both Schopenhauer’s denial of 
the Will to Live and the Buddhist conception of nirvana, has another name: amor fati, the 
love of fate. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche makes this explicit:  
Meine Formel für die Größe am Menschen ist amor fati: daß man nichts 
anders haben will, vorwärts nicht, rückwärts nicht, in alle Ewigkeit nicht. Das 
Notwendige nicht bloß ertragen, noch weniger verhehlen… sondern es lieben. 
 
My formula for what is great in a human being is amor fati: that one wants to 
have nothing different, not forwards, not backwards, not for all eternity. Not 
merely to bear what is necessary, still less to hide it away… but to love it. (EH 
“Warum ich so klug bin” §10; cf. Kaufmann 284-86)  
 
We hear immediate echoes of the above passage from Beyond Good and Evil in which 
Nietzsche describes his “inverted ideal,” which alerts us to the fact that he has the same idea 
in mind. In both passages he speaks of an affirmation “for all eternity” (in alle Ewigkeit), that 
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is, that one wants everything to eternally return, exactly as it already was and is. What is 
made clear in the later discussion of amor fati from Ecce Homo, however, is the element of 
love: the truly great humans, the Übermenschen, love their fate as members of the world of 
becoming, subject to all of its changes and pains. As we have seen, Nietzsche contrasts this 
love for the world with the hatred of the Romantic pessimists, who are unable to accept or 
embrace suffering, and consequently direct their will away from the world of becoming and 
toward some imaginary Real World. Conversely, the representatives of Nietzsche’s goal, the 
Übemenschen, are characterised by their cultivation of amor fati and their joyous affirmation 
of the eternal return of the actual, existent world – a world filled with suffering.  
Hesse’s Anti-Buddhist Goal: 
Siddhartha and the Affirmation of Eternal Rebirth 
 
We now need to determine if there are genuine correspondences between Nietzsche’s 
goal of amor fati and Siddhartha’s final goal. To do this, we will draw from the three most 
important narrative descriptions of the latter. First, there is Siddhartha’s ecstatic vision on the 
riverside, which carries him to the final state of perfection (Vollendung). Secondly, there is 
Siddhartha’s attempt to communicate to Govinda what he has learned from his vision. The 
third narrative description of Siddhartha’s goal occurs as Siddhartha later imparts a similar 
vision onto Govinda.25 
 The central motif of all three of these events is the experience of timelessness. Prior to 
Siddhartha’s final vision, he has already learned from his observation of the river “daß es 
keine Zeit gibt” [that there is no time], in the sense that “Nichts war, nichts wird sein; alles 
ist, alles hat Wesen und Gegenwart” [Nothing was, nothing will be; everything is, everything 
has essence and presence] (GD3 698). This understanding is derived from his observation 
that the river is “überall zugleich” [everywhere at once]: at the mouth, at the falls, at the sea, 
or at the stream trickling down from the mountain. There is no future for the river, only 
presence (ibid.).  
35 
This idea is later expressed visually in Siddhartha’s ecstatic vision in the chapter 
“Om.” As he peers from the bank into the river, he sees visions of himself, grieving after his 
son flees from home, coupled with a vision of his father, grieving Siddhartha’s own flight 
from his home city. An image of Siddhartha’s son appears, and all three generations – 
Siddhartha, his father, and his son – flow into one another and dissolve into the river rushing 
by. The river soon becomes the showplace of “allen Menschen” [all people], each one 
striving with the current, each one reaching the goal (alle Ziele wurden erreicht) (GD3 720). 
The water, still the stage of Siddhartha’s vision, steams and rises to the heavens, pouring back 
down again from vaporous clouds to collect and form puddles, brooks, streams, and 
eventually new rivers (ibid.). The people begin to sing; there are voices of joy and pain, good 
and evil. The voice flow together, become indiscernible. Everything together is “der Fluß des 
Lebens, …die Musik des Lebens” [The river of life, …the music of life] (ibid.). The only 
thing that separates these figures and voices is the passing of time. When one sees through 
the veil of time, however, all things take equal part in the eternal reprise of life and universal 
striving.   
The imagery in Govinda’s vision also points toward an experience of the timeless:  
Er sah das Gesicht eines neugeborenen Kindes, rot und voll Falten, zum 
Weinen verzogen – er sah das Gesicht eines Mörders, sah ihn ein Messer in 
den Leib eines Menschen stechen – er sah, zur selben Sekunde, diesen 
Verbrecher gefesselt knien und sein Haupt vom Henker mit einem 
Schwertschlag abgeschlagen werden – er sah die Körper von Männern und 
Frauen nackt in Stellungen und Kämpfen rasender Liebe – er sah Leichen 
ausgestreckt, still, kalt, leer – er sah Tierköpfe… – er sah Götter... – er sah alle 
diese Gestalten und Gesichter[,] …jede war ein Sterbenwollen, ein 
leidenschaftlich schmerzliches Bekenntnis der Vergänglichkeit, und keine 
starb doch, jede verwandelte sich nur, wurde stets neu geboren, bekam stets 
ein neues Gesicht, ohne daß doch zwischen einem und dem anderen Gesicht 
Zeit gelegen wäre. 
 
He saw the face of a newborn child, red and full of folds, scrunched, crying – 
he saw the face of a murderer, saw him stick a knife into the body of another 
man – he saw, at the same moment, the culprit tied-up, on his knees, his head 
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lopped from his body by the executioner’s sword – he saw the bodies of men 
and women, naked, in the positions and bouts of frantic love – he saw corpses 
stretched out, still, cold, and empty – he saw the heads of animals… – he saw 
gods… –  he saw all of these forms and faces… each was a desire for death, a 
passionate and painful confession of impermanence, yet none died, each one 
just changed, was born anew, received a new face, without there being the 
slightest passing of time between each face and the next. (732-32) 
 
Perhaps even more powerfully than the vision of Siddhartha, Govinda’s vision 
captures the sense of timelessness being conveyed narratively. We are carried along the 
lifespan of a single person, from rosy-cheeked infancy to desperate criminality and finally 
death by execution. From this individual lifespan, we are brought to frenzied representations 
of human procreation and death: uncounted bodies tangled amid the rush of sexual passion, 
juxtaposed with countless corpses, all of them motionless, frigid, and lifeless. From the 
human, we proceed to the more-encompassing animal, then to the all-encompassing divine, 
transcendent sphere; the differentiation of birth, life, and death is shown to be nothing but a 
relic of our temporal interpretation of events and our inability to step outside of this 
interpretive frame. Though each of these events seems to bring something into or tear 
something out of existence, each is at its heart nothing but a shift in appearance. Each is but 
the donning of a new and different form by a transcendent life-force, which eternally and 
omnipresently reenters samsara, the world of becoming, by means of reincarnation and 
rebirth.  
 The careful reader will note here that Siddhartha’s and Govinda’s visions are basically 
recapitulations of Schopenhauer’s description of the experience of the saint, who is capable 
of seeing through space and time and immediately perceiving the underlying unity of all 
things (above, p. 24-25). Furthermore, the notion of a timeless life-force that sustains itself 
through eternal rebirth into the world of becoming is indistinguishable from Schopenhauer’s 
idea of the Will to Live. Considering these similarities, it would be very easy to conclude that 
Siddhartha’s goal is in line with Schopenhauer’s description of nirvana. This would, in turn, 
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imply that Siddhartha, like Gotama, seeks to flee from the world of becoming to some Real 
World in which there is no desire or suffering.  
This conclusion, however, is easily refuted when we look at Siddhartha’s attempt to 
explain his vision to Govinda. Specifically, at the heart of Siddhartha’s teaching, we see him 
tell Govinda of his love for the things of the world. In opposition to Gotama, who, according 
to Govinda, “forbid us to shackle our hearts with love to worldly things” (above, p. 21), 
Siddhartha embraces the thingliness of the world. He does not, like Gotama, see salvation in 
the “inner detachment from the things of the world” (above, p. 21) but rather in the complete 
self-surrender to the world of becoming and all of the things therein. To Siddhartha, it does 
not matter that the things of the world are deceptive or impermanent; in fact, this makes them 
all the more worthy of love. As he explains to Govinda:  
Mögen die Dinge [der Welt] Schein oder nicht, auch bin alsdann ja Schein, 
und so sind sie stets meinesgleichen. Das ist es, was sie mir so lieb und 
verehenswert macht: sie sind meinesgleichen. Darum kann ich sie lieben. 
 
The things [of the world] may be illusion or not. If so, then I am just as well 
illusory, and so the things are always of my own kind. In my mind, that is 
what makes them so dear and venerable: they are of my own kind. Thus can I 
love them. (GD3 728) 
 
We see Siddhartha locate his goal in the very same world from which Gotama seeks to flee. 
He does not, like Gotama, deny his fate as a transitory being among the impermanent things 
of the world, but rather accepts and embraces his fate as a thing among things.  
Just as Nietzsche’s Übermensch, Siddhartha dismisses the notion that there is a Real 
World beyond the world in which he lives. His yearning, his love, is directed at the world of 
becoming and suffering. He states this to Govinda clearly: 
Ich habe an meinem Leibe und an meiner Seele erfahren, daß ich der Sünde 
sehr bedurfte, ich bedurfte der Wollust, des Strebens nach Gütern, der Eitelkeit 
und bedurfte der schmählichsten Verzweiflung, um das Widerstreben 
aufgeben zu lernen, um die Welt lieben zu lernen, um sie nicht mehr mit 
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irgendeiner von mir gewünschten, von mir eingebildeten Welt zu vergleichen, 
sondern sie zu lassen, wie sie ist, und sie zu lieben, und ihr gerne anzuhören. 
 
[In both body and soul I have experienced that I was in great need of sin. I 
needed lust; I needed to strive for goods; I needed vanity and the most 
despicable despair. I needed all this so that I could learn to give up my 
resistance, so that I could learn to love the world and no longer compare it 
with some imaginary world I wished for, but to let it be as it is, and to love it, 
and to belong to it gladly.] (GD3 726) 
 
We see, then, that Siddhartha’s goal, like Nietzsche’s, is a double motion. It is both a return 
to the world of becoming as well as a destruction of the imaginary Real World. As he 
realizes, “Sinn und Wesen waren nicht irgendwo hinter den Dingen, sie waren in ihnen, in 
allem” [Meaning and essence were not anywhere behind the things; they were in them, in 
everything] (647; emphasis added). 
 It still remains to be seen if Siddhartha’s goal, like Nietzsche’s, is the affirmation of 
the eternal return. Supporting this idea, there is a particularly telling scene just after 
Siddhartha leaves the city and attempts to drown himself in the river. By some simple twist of 
fate, he survives and has a transformative experience of the sacred Om. Washing back onto 
shore, Siddhartha thinks to himself, 
Wunderlich in der Tat war mein Leben… Wunderliche Umwege hat es 
genommen. ...Aber welch ein Weg war das! Ich habe durch so viel Dummheit, 
durch so viel Laster, durch so viel Irrtum, durch so viel Ekel und Enttäuschung 
und Jammer hindurchgehen müssen, bloß um wieder ein Kind zu werden und 
neu anfangen zu können. Aber es war richtig so, mein Herz sagt ja 
dazu...Wohin noch mag mein Weg mich führen? ...Er geht in Schleifen, er 
geht vielleicht im Kreise. Mag er gehen, wie er will, ich will ihn gehen. 
 
Indeed, my life was strange. ...It took strange detours. But what a way it was! I 
have had to go through so much foolishness, through so much vice, through so 
much error, through so much disgust and disappointment and misery, just so 
that I could become a child again and begin anew. But just so was it proper; 
my heart says yes to all that… Where else will my way lead me? It goes in 




Siddhartha’s heart – his will – says yes to his strange life and everything that has happened in 
it: all the errors, vices, and sufferings. Just as in the case of Nietzsche’s Übermensch, it is the 
things that turn the Buddhist away from life – suffering and the vanity of striving – that 
Siddhartha so radically affirms and wills. Again, similar to Nietzsche, Siddhartha describes 
his will to repetition: his life’s way, Siddhartha says, “goes in loops, perhaps it goes in a 
circle. May it go where it will; I will follow it.” He even speaks of himself as a child, who has 
returned into the world from a past incarnation. Indeed, this is the exact thought he has as he 
washes to the shore: “Im ersten Augenblick der Besinnung erschien ihm dies frühere Leben 
wie eine... einstige Verkörperung, wie eine frühere Vorgeburt seines jetzigen Ichs” [In the 
first moment of consciousness this earlier life appeared to him as a… former embodiment, as 
an earlier birth of his present self] (GD3 684). Siddhartha, then, affirms the eternal return – at 
least, the latter as clad in the Indian mask of eternal rebirth. Like Nietzsche’s Übermensch, he 
“has not simply learned to come to terms with himself and tolerate what was and is, but wants 
to have it all again, just as it was and is, for all eternity” (above, p. 33). 
In a journal entry from January 1921, just as he is finishing the chapter “Gotama,” 
Hesse himself even describes Siddhartha’s goal as the affirmation of eternal rebirth. He 
writes, “Siddharta wird, wenn er stirbt, nicht Nirwana wollen, sondern neuen Umlauf, neue 
Gestaltung, Wiedergeburt.” [When Siddhartha dies, he will not want nirvana, but rather new 
circulation, new formation, rebirth] (MS 1 11). Siddhartha, then, is driven by his love for his 
fate as a member of the world of fleeting forms – what Schopenhauer would call “mere 
appearances” (above, p. 18) – to affirm the prospect of rebirth and return. His attitude is pure 
amor fati.   
In contrast to Siddhartha’s attitude of amor fati and his affirmation of eternal rebirth, 
we recall that Gotama “had attained nirvana and would never again return [wiederkehren] 
into the lifecycle; never again would he dive into the murky stream of forms” (above, p. 21). 
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Gotama denies just what Siddhartha affirms: the eternal return via rebirth into the world of 
changing forms. A letter Hesse writes in 1930 strengthens this idea. The teaching of the 
Buddha, Hesse explains, deals explicitly with the idea of “ewige Wiederkehr” [eternal return] 
(MS1 210), by which Hesse specifically means the cycle of rebirth. This, however, is really 
nothing new; the idea had been present in Indian religion long before the Buddha entered the 
world stage. What makes Buddha’s teaching so unique, is rather his “neue Lehre von der 
Erlösung aus der ewigen Wiederkehr, vom Weg zu Nirwana” [new teaching about the 
salvation from the eternal return, about the way to nirvana] (ibid.). Though written almost a 
decade after the publication of Siddhartha, Hesse’s quick synopsis serves to solidify the 
above argument. The Buddha preaches a way out of the eternal return of rebirth because it is 
seen as the ultimate source of suffering.  
The language of “return” (Wiederkehr) that Hesse uses is not simply coincidental; it is 
a direct reference to Nietzsche’s thought of the eternal return. Though Nietzsche typically 
refers to the thought as Wiederkunft (cf. EH “Zarathustra” §1), he does use the term 
Wiederkehr interchangeably (cf. Z “Der Genesende” §2). The latter term is simply the one 
that Hesse latches onto, as we can see from a political piece that Hesse publishes in April of 
1920 under the title “Zarathustra’s Wiederkehr” [Zarathustra’s Return] (MS1 37).26 
Furthermore, in a poem from 1901 titled “Belauschtes Nachtgespräch” [“An Overheard 
Conversation at Night”], Hesse references “Die Lehre von der ewigen Wiederkehr” [the 
teaching of the eternal return] (GD5 477). This same poem makes overt reference to 
Nietzsche, and interestingly, can even be taken as a debate between Nietzsche and 
Schopenhauer, or at least between adherents of their respective worldviews: one interlocutor, 
like Schopenhauer, sees the highest virtue as “Weltensagung” [world-renunciation] while the 
other rebukes by citing Nietzsche (GD5 476-77). 
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Similarly, Siddhartha itself can be read as a dialogue between Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche, or at least representatives of their respective worldviews. There is, at one pole, 
Siddhartha Gotama, who, like Schopenhauer, establishes nirvana, the denial of samsara, as 
the goal of his teaching. At the other pole, there is Siddhartha the protagonist, who, like 
Nietzsche, turns the Buddhist goal on its head and sets up a new goal of the radical 
affirmation of the world of becoming, of samsara. The antithesis between Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche is thus mirrored by the two Siddharthas, whose opposing worldviews tear 
Siddhartha the novel apart. In the following chapter, we will see how their opposing 



















The Smile, Symbol of Reconciliation 
 
  
 The final pages of Siddhartha contain a stunning image: Siddhartha’s smiling face, 
permeating Govinda’s ecstatic vision of the stream of worldly existence. At first glance, it 
seems to be the perfect symbol for Siddhartha’s affirmation of samsara. He is smiling, we 
might think, therefore he must be expressing his love for the world. Observing the smile only 
in relation to Siddhartha the protagonist, that is, we might take it as a one-sided symbol, as a 
symbol of world-affirmation. 
 This conclusion, however, would lead to the dissolution of the present argument, for 
not only Siddhartha, but also Gotama is characterized by his smile. In fact, the smiles of 
Siddhartha and Gotama, as we will see, are identical in both appearance and symbolic 
significance. This, in turn, seems to lead to the conclusion that either Gotama, like 
Siddhartha, is world-affirming, or that Siddhartha’s smile is actually a symbol of Buddhistic 
world-denial. However, there is another way of interpreting the smile that maintains the 
present argument and harmonizes with greater trends in Hesse’s work. Specifically, we will 
argue that the smile does not signify world-affirmation or denial per se, but rather an 
overarching attitude shared by Siddhartha and Gotama that can find expression in both of 
their opposing worldviews. This attitude, as we will see, is what Hesse refers to as “sich 
fallen lassen,” or “letting oneself fall.”  
The relation between sich fallen lassen and the smile is first presented in a work 
Hesse writes just prior to Siddhartha, namely, Klein and Wagner (1919). By engaging this 
text first, we will prepare a much stronger basis for our analysis of sich fallen lassen in 
Siddhartha, as well as its relation to the symbol of the smile. Before we can do this, however, 
we need to solidify the claim that Siddhartha and Gotama’s smiles are identical.  
Different Words, Same Smile 
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Aside from the boat man Vasudeva, whom we will address in the next chapter, there 
are only two characters in Siddhartha who reach the goal of enlightenment (Vollendung). The 
first is Gotama, representative of a life- and world-denying, or in our terminology, 
Schopenhauerian, worldview. The second figure is Siddhartha, who embodies the 
Nietzschean goal of life- and world-affirmation. Though Siddhartha himself recognizes the 
polarity of his and Gotama’s expressed worldviews, he nonetheless believes there is 
something that unites him with Gotama. As Siddhartha says to Govinda in the final chapter,  
Ich kann nicht leugnen, meine Worte von der Liebe stehen im Widerspruch, 
im scheinbaren Widerspruch zu Gotamas Worten. Eben darum mißtraue ich 
den Worten so sehr, denn ich weiß, dieser Widerspruch ist Täuschung. Ich 
weiß, daß ich mit Gotama einig bin.  
 
I cannot deny that my words concerning love contradict, seemingly contradict 
Gotama’s words. It is just for this reason that I distrust words so much, for I 
know that this contradiction is deception. I know that Gotama and I are united. 
(GD3 729). 
 
Siddhartha, however, never seeks to work out the contradictions between his own worldview 
and Gotama’s. On the contrary, he simply lets them stand. This unresolved tension is one of 
the elements of the work that makes it so interesting, and certainly one that causes the reader 
to search beyond what is said for some unifying thread between Siddhartha and Gotama.  
Siddhartha himself gives a hint of an answer. He explains to Govinda,  
Auch bei ihm, auch bei deinem großen Lehrer [Gotama], ist mir das Ding 
lieber als die Worte, sein Tun und Leben wichtiger als sein Reden, die 
Gebärde seiner Hand wichtiger als seine Meinungen. 
 
Also with him, also with your great teacher [Gotama], the thing is more dear 
to me than the words, his doing and his living more important that his 
speaking, the gestures of his hand more important than his opinions. (729)  
 
Any synthesizing point between the two figures, Siddhartha suggests, is not to be found in 
their words or teachings – that is, their expressed worldviews, which have been the subject of 
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our analysis so far. Rather, Siddhartha hints, this thread is to be found in their actions, their 
doings. As there is only one action of symbolic importance common to both Siddhartha and 
Gotama – namely, the smile – this is the most reasonable place to search for a point of 
reconciliation.  
There are certainly suggestions that Siddhartha and Gotama’s smiles might not be 
identical. For instance, in the first narrative description of Gotama, we read: “sein stilles 
Gesicht war weder fröhlich noch traurig, er schien leise nach innen zu lächeln” [his tranquil 
face was neither happy nor sad, he seemed to smile quietly inward] (637; emphasis added). 
Unlike the Buddha’s inward-directed smile, Siddartha’s smile is always directed outward: we 
see him “aus den alten Augen lächelnd” [smiling out of his old eyes] (722; emphasis added). 
Each of their respective smiles, then, has a distinct direction. In light of this, one might argue 
that the narrative attempts to bring the two smiles more into line with their respective 
teachings: whereas Gotama preaches a stoical resignation from the things of the world and 
turns his smile inward, Siddhartha preaches love for all worldly things and pours his smile 
outward.  
There is, however, much more evidence to support the claim that the two smiles are 
meant to be equated. In the final pages, we find:  
Dies Lächeln Siddharthas war genau dasselbe, war genau das gleiche, stille, 
feine, undurchdringliche, vielleicht gütige, vielleicht spöttische, weise, 
tausendfältige Lächeln Gotamas, des Buddha.  
 
This smile of Siddartha was exactly the same, was exactly the even, tranquil, 
subtle, impenetrable, perhaps kind, perhaps mocking, wise, thousandfold smile 
of Gotama, the Buddha. (732)  
 
Directly after this, we read: Siddhartha “lächelte still, lächelte leise und sanft, vielleicht sehr 
gütig, vielleicht sehr spöttisch, genau, wie Er gelächelt hatte, der Erhabene” [smiled silently, 
smiled softly and faintly, perhaps very kindly, perhaps very mockingly, exactly as He had 
smiled, the Sublime One] (732-33). This repetition of identical descriptions and the repeated 
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use of the word “exactly” (genau) emphasize that the smile is a symbolic means of bridging 
these two characters. As no other passage in the book describes a shared action of Gotama 
and Siddhartha so emphatically, we can reason that the primary physical gesture that unites 
them is the smile. 
What does this smile mean? As Siddhartha is by no means an expository text, we will 
first observe the role of the smile in Klein and Wagner, a novella written by Hesse directly 
before Siddhartha, to show that the smile is the expression of an attitude Hesse calls sich 
fallen lassen, or letting oneself fall. This method of exposition is certainly limited in that each 
text is and ought to be considered a world in itself. For this reason, our analysis of Klein and 
Wagner can by no means serve as a final judgment of the meaning of the smile in Siddhartha. 
Nonetheless, in Siddhartha there are resounding echoes of the concept of sich fallen lassen as 
first presented in Klein and Wagner, and more importantly, of its relation to the symbol of the 
smile. Our preliminary investigation of Klein and Wagner, then, will ultimately lead us to a 
richer and more precise treatment of certain aspects of the smile that are less apparent in 
Siddhartha. 
Sich fallen lassen in Klein and Wagner 
 
In Klein and Wagner, Hesse relates the semi-autobiographical tale of a man, Friedrich 
Klein, who flees from his home in Germany to a small town in Italy. Here, Klein begins an 
affair with a dancer named Teresina, but soon thereafter develops symptoms of a dangerous 
schizophrenia. Most notably, he starts to harbor feelings of spiritual affiliation with Ernst 
August Wagner, a German school teacher who, in 1913, murders his wife and children, 
among nine others (cf. Winkler). At the end of the novella, Klein nearly succumbs to the 
desire to murder Teresina in imitation of Wagner’s crime. Just before he carries through, 
however, he decides to end his own life by rowing a small boat onto a lake and dropping 
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himself off the side. In typical Hesse fashion, the novella ends with Klein’s premortem 
mystical vision.  
 Despite its ending, it would be a mistake to think that Klein and Wagner is a treatise 
on the value of suicide. Rather, it aims at a much more subtle and spiritually important 
attitude, which Hesse names sich fallen lassen, letting oneself fall. For certain, Klein literally 
lets himself fall off the side of a rowboat in order to drown himself, but this is not the primary 
focus of the work. As the narrative makes clear, the focus is Klein’s newfound attitude, his 
willingness to let himself fall. His resultant death is immaterial; the narrator assures us: “Daß 
er sich ins Wasser und in den Tod fallen ließ, wäre nicht notwendig gewesen, ebensogut hätte 
er sich ins Leben fallen lassen können” [That he let himself fall into water and into death was 
not necessary. He could just as well have let himself fall into life] (GD3 549). 
Because the attitude of sich fallen lassen is not meant to be taken literally, it is 
important to observe the more abstract definitions given by Klein. For instance, he further 
clarifies sich fallen lassen as “den Schritt in das Ungewisse hinaus, den kleinen Schritt 
hinweg über alle die Versicherungen, die es gab” [the step out into the unknown, the small 
step away from all of one’s assurances] (550). Also, it is described as “sich dahingeben” 
[giving oneself forth], “sich ergeben” [surrendering], and “auf alle Stützen und Boden 
verzichten” [relinquishing every support and solid ground] (549). What seems most important 
about the attitude of sich fallen lassen is that those who let themselves fall cease to resist, and 
specifically, that they cease to resist the natural course of the world. They no longer protect 
themselves by shunning unfamiliar ideas or situations; Klein even compares the small boat 
off of which he lets himself fall to “sein kleines, umgrenztes, künstlich versichertes Leben” 
[his small, confined, artificially guarded life] (GD3 548).  
Disposing of the concepts that have grounded and restrained their lives, Klein further 
recognizes, those who let themselves fall gravitate toward a central universal power, toward a 
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will greater than their own. At least within the scope of Klein and Wagner, this greater will is 
the will of god. As Klein realizes in his final moments, there is “nur eine Kunst, nur eine 
Lehre, nur Ein Geheimnis: sich fallen lassen, sich nicht gegen Gottes Willen sträuben” [only 
one art, only one teaching, only one secret: letting oneself fall, not struggling against god’s 
will] (551). However, we are not confronted with the familiar god of Abrahamic monotheism. 
The god of Klein and Wagner desires only to bask, passively, in the “Musik der Weltchöre” 
[music of the world’s choruses] (554). Similar to Siddhartha’s ecstatic vision on the 
riverbank, in which he hears the “music of life” (above, p. 35), this world chorus in Klein and 
Wagner is a cacophonous harmony. There are voices of good and evil, war and peace; there 
are sufferers and conquerors, affirmers and deniers (cf. GD3 553). Some call god light, some 
darkness; some see god as mother, some as father; god is praised as creator and loathed as 
destroyer (554). There is no one right way to relate oneself to this god; “Jeder könnte suchen, 
jeder könnte finden” [Everyone could search. Everyone could find] (554). For this god does 
not name himself*, but only desires to be named. Indeed, the only positive activity attributed 
to this god is his will, specifically his will to exist in the recognition of living creatures, 
whether this recognition is positive or negative: “Er wollte gennant, er wollte geliebt, 
verflucht, gehaßt, angebetet sein, denn die Musik der Weltchöre war sein Gotteshaus und sein 
Leben” [He wanted to be named; he wanted to be loved, cursed, hated, prayed to. For the 
music of the world’s choruses was his house and his life” (554). Klein’s experience shows 
that this house of god, composed of the manifold voices of the creatures of the world, is the 
central point toward which people let themselves fall. 
A possible weakness in Hesse’s idea of sich fallen lassen is that the corresponding 
conception of god may be too vague. How can people determine if there is even a distinct 
point toward which they are falling? They could simply be, in Nietzsche’s words, falling 
                                               
* Following Hesse, I will refer to god with the masculine pronoun. 
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“durch ein unendliches Nichts” [through an eternal nothingness] (FW §125). Perhaps in 
anticipation of this pitfall, Hesse adds a second principle element to the concept of sich fallen 
lassen: the idea that individuals can hear within themselves their true voices among the 
world’s choruses. As Klein thinks to himself, 
Woher war diese holde Stimme gekommen? …Auf welchem Ast saß dieser 
seltne, scheue Vogel? Diese Stimme sprach die Wahrheit… Diese Stimme 
entstand, wenn man im Herzen mit dem Schicksal einig war… sie war Gottes 
Stimme, oder war die Stimme des eigenen, wahrsten, innersten Ich. 
 
Where had this voice come from? …On which branch sat this rare, shy bird? 
This voice spoke the truth… This voice arose if and when one, in his heart, 
was at one with his destiny… it was god’s voice, or it was the voice of one’s 
own, truest, innermost self. (GD3 494) 
 
The inner voice – the song of this “rare, shy bird” – is the voice of both god and one’s 
destiny. To heed this voice, then, is to fulfill one’s destiny in the divine ordinance, to live 
truly and authentically. However, when one’s mind is buzzing with idle chatter and all too 
familiar concepts, the “truest, innermost” voice is drowned out. As the narrator asks, “Warum 
konnte er diese Stimme nicht immer hören? Warum flog die Wahrheit an ihm immer vorbei 
wie ein Gespenst?” [Why could he not always hear this voice? Why did the truth always fly 
past him like a ghost?] (494). Before individuals can live authentically, before they can find 
their true voices among the choruses of the world, they must let themselves fall, banishing the 
white noise of the everyday world, the stagnant concepts that stand in the way of the 
attainment of destiny.  
Klein’s final realization is that when individuals let themselves fall, they attain the 
final goal of salvation (Erlösung). We should not, however, think that this salvation is a 
return to some divine and peaceful Real World. As Klein recognizes in his final ecstatic 
moments, there is no “Bleiben in Gott” [abiding in god] or otherworldly “Ruhe” [peace] 
(551). There is only the world in which we live and “das ewige, ewige, herrliche, heilige 
Ausgeatmetwerden und Eingeatmetwerden, Gestaltung und Auflösung, Geburt und Tod, 
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Auszug und Wiederkehr, ohne Pause, ohne Ende” [the eternal, eternal, wonderful, holy 
being-exhaled and being-inhaled, formation and dissolution, birth and death, departure and 
return, without pause, without end] (GD3 551). As there is no divine, otherworldly peace to 
be found, Klein realizes, “Es gab eine andere Ruhe, im eigenen Innern zu finden. Sie hieß: 
Laß dich fallen! Wehre dich nicht! Stirb gern! Lebe gern!” [There was another peace that was 
to be found in one’s inner self. It was called: Let yourself fall! Resist nothing! Die gladly! 
Live gladly!” (551). The concept of sich fallen lassen, then, individualizes the idea of a final 
peace or salvation. There is not one goal or one teaching that can lead there, for peace is only 
found in the willingness to let oneself fall and heed the call of destiny. This destiny may be 
death, life, affirmation, or denial; none of this matters. All that matters is letting oneself fall.  
The Smile as Symbol of sich fallen lassen in Klein and Wagner 
 
A symbolic gesture is the objective correlative of a corresponding attitude, the attitude 
made object. For instance, a writer might use a clenched fist to symbolize defiance, or a 
finger pointed skyward to signify a character’s idealism. In the case of sich fallen lassen, the 
symbolic gesture is the smile.  
We can draw this connection because in all of the mental descriptions of sich fallen 
lassen, the smile is the only bodily gesture mentioned. Just as Klein has his final realization 
about the salvific power of sich fallen lassen, we read:  
Wie hatte er sein Leben lang Angst gelitten, und nun, wo der Tod ihn schon 
am Halse würgte, fühlte er nichts mehr davon, keine Angst, kein Grauen, nur 
Lächeln, nur Erlösung, nur Einverstandensein  
 
How he had suffered his entire life, and now, when death had him by the 
throat, he felt no more of that, no fear, no dread, only smiling, only salvation, 
only acceptance. (GD3 549; emphasis added)  
 
Every other descriptor in this passage – the lack of fear and dread, the deep acceptance, 
salvation – refers to the attitude, or the inner side, of sich fallen lassen. Only the smile stands 
forth as a bodily gesture capable of containing the immensity and ambiguity of this attitude. 
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In this sense, it is the perfect choice; as German philosopher and sociologist, Helmuth 
Plessner (1892-1985), begins his wonderful essay ”Das Lächeln” [The Smile], the smile 
surpasses all other gestures in respect to ambiguity (Vieldeutigkeit) (Plessner 175). 
The smile, however, is not unique to Klein. It is rather the definitive gesture of all 
those who have let themselves fall and attained salvation, even the murderer Wagner. Indeed, 
Wagner’s killing spree, Klein realizes, is an instance of sich fallen lassen; it is an escape from 
the constraints of bourgeois values and the fulfillment of his ownmost destiny (cf. 485, 527). 
It is for this reason that Klein, in his final moments of consciousness, beholds Wagner, 
smiling:  
Der Mörder Wagner, dessen Schatten so breit über Kleins Leben gefallen war, 
lächelte ihm ernst ins Gesicht, und sein Lächeln erzählte, daß auch Wagners 
Tat ein Weg zur Erlösung gewesen war, auch sie ein Atemzug, auch sie ein 
Symbol, und daß auch Mord und Blut und Scheußlichkeit nicht Dinge sind, 
welche wahrhaft existieren, sondern nur Wertungen unsrer eigenen, 
selbstquälerischen Seele. 
 
The murderer, Wagner, whose shadow had fallen so completely over Klein’s 
life, smiled at him solemnly, and his smile told that Wagner’s deed had also 
been a way to salvation, a breath, a symbol, and that even murder and blood 
and atrocity are not things that truly exist, but are merely valuations of our 
own self-tormenting soul. (GD3 551-52)  
 
The nihilistic implications of this passage will be further discussed in the conclusion. For 
now, it suffices to recognize that Wagner, like Klein, smiles because he has let himself fall. 
Sich fallen lassen in Siddhartha 
 
As we mentioned above (p. 42), Siddhartha’s smile should not be taken as a symbol 
of his life- and world-affirmation per se, as it is identical with the smile of Gotama, who 
preaches the denial of both life and world. It would make no sense aesthetically to have the 
smile represent two polar worldviews simultaneously – that is, unless the smile were actually 
the objective correlative of some overarching attitude that can find expression in both. 
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Furthermore, if this overarching attitude is sich fallen lassen, then the latter must be present 
in both Siddhartha and Gotama. 
Tellingly, the term itself occurs only twice throughout Siddhartha, and both 
occurrences are in reference to either Siddhartha or Gotama. The first of these is found in 
Siddhartha’s own self-description to his lover, Kamala. After she asks Siddhartha how it is 
that he is so lucky and successful, why so many doors just seem to open up for him, he 
responds: 
Wenn du einen Stein ins Wasser wirfst, so eilt er auf dem schnellsten Wege 
zum Grunde des Wassers. So ist es, wenn Siddhartha ein Ziel, einen Vorsatz 
hat. Siddhartha tut nichts, er wartet, er denkt, er fastet, aber er geht durch die 
Dinge der Welt hindurch wie der Stein durchs Wasser, ohne etwas zu tun, 
ohne sich zu rühren; er wird gezogen, er läßt sich fallen. Sein Ziel zieht ihn an 
sich, denn er läßt nichts in seine Seele ein, was dem Ziel widerstreben könnte. 
 
When you throw a stone into the water, it hurries along the quickest route to 
the bottom. This is how it is when Siddhartha has a goal or intention. 
Siddhartha does nothing. He waits, he thinks, he fasts, but he goes through the 
things of the world like a stone through the water, without doing anything, 
without moving. He is pulled along, he lets himself fall [er läßt sich fallen]. 
His goal pulls him to itself, for he lets nothing enter his soul that could work 
against his goal. (662-63; emphasis added) 
 
Siddhartha’s statement holds true to the most important aspects of sich fallen lassen as 
presented in Klein and Wagner. He allows himself to be drawn along; he surrenders to the 
fall, paying little or no heed to the comforts of the world that would hinder him from attaining 
his goal or destiny. Siddhartha falls like a stone; he is one of those truly authentic individuals 
who go “eine feste Bahn, kein Wind erreicht sie, in sich selber haben sie ihr Gesetz und ihre 
Bahn” [a straight way, no wind reaches them, in themselves they have their law and their 
way] (671). Those who don’t let themselves fall, on the other hand, who resist the pull of 
their destinies, “weh[en] und dreh[en] sich durch die Luft, und schwank[en], und taumel[n] 
zu Boden” [drift and turn through the air, [they] waver and whirl [their] way to the ground] 
(ibid.).  
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Siddhartha continues to explain to Kamala that he knows of only one other person 
who, like himself, lets himself fall: Gotama. He says, 
Unter allen Gelehrten und Samanas, deren ich viele kannte, war einer von dieser 
Art, ein Vollkommener, nie kann ich ihn vergessen. Es ist jener Gotama, der 
Erhabene, der Verkündiger jener Lehre. Tausend Jünger hören jeden Tag seine 
Lehre, folgen jede Stunde seiner Vorschrift, aber sie alle sind fallendes Laub, 
nicht in sich selbst haben sie Lehre und Gesetz. 
 
Among the many the scholars and Samanas I have known, there has been only 
one who was of this type, a Perfect One. I can never forget him. It was Gotama, 
the Sublime One, proclaimer of that doctrine. A thousand youths listen to his 
doctrine every day, every hour they follow his prescriptions27. But they are all just 
falling leaves, in their own selves they have neither law nor doctrine. (GD3 671) 
 
Siddhartha sets up the same dichotomy between those who fall like leaves, resisting the tug of 
gravity, and those who fall like stones, fast and true to the ground. Whereas the former are 
mere emulators, following prescriptions they neither understand nor feel to be true, only the 
latter are courageous enough to enact the laws of their hearts, the doctrines and destinies they 
hold within themselves. As of this point in the novel, only Siddhartha and Gotama, whom we 
have seen to represent the opposing worldviews that tear Siddhartha apart, fall into the latter 
category.  
The second passage in which sich fallen lassen appears – this time only in reference 
to Siddhartha – is a direct parallel to its occurrence in Klein and Wagner. Siddhartha has 
abandoned his home in the city where he lived for years, believing he could find there the 
happiness that eluded him in his time of study and asceticism. But dipping low in the lap of 
luxury and sensual delights, he finds himself still deeply unhappy. He is driven to despair, 
and attempts suicide by letting himself fall from a tree branch into the river: 
Mit verzerrtem Gesichte starrte er ins Wasser, sah sein Gesicht gespiegelt und 
spie danach. In tiefer Müdigkeit löste er den Arm vom Baumstamme und 
drehte sich ein wenig, um sich senkrecht hinabfallen zu lassen, um endlich 
unterzugehen. Er sank, mit geschlossenen Augen, dem Tod entgegen. 
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His visage twisted, he stared into the water, saw his mirrored face and spit at 
it. In his profound exhaustion, he loosed his arm from the tree branch and 
turned his body slightly, to let himself fall straight down [sich hinabfallen 
lassen], to finally go under. He sank, with closed eyes, deathward. (GD3 683) 
 
Siddhartha’s suicide attempt is unsuccessful, but it reinvigorates his spirit. In the same instant 
his body sinks beneath the river’s surface, he hears the sacred tones of the Om, the syllable 
common to Vedic prayer that symbolizes the “Namenlose” [nameless] and “Vollendete” 
[perfect] unity of all things (GD3 684). Later, in Siddhartha’s ecstatic vision toward the end 
of the novel, the Om returns as the culminating harmony of the music of life, the unity of all 
the dissonant voices of created beings. The Om in Siddhartha, then, is symbolically identical 
to the house of god in Klein and Wagner. But whereas Klein’s fall into the lake leads to his 
death, Siddharta survives his fall; he falls into life, and is able to bring the transcendent 
knowledge he gains back to the world. 
 As we recognized in our analysis of Klein and Wagner, there is another characteristic 
element of the attitude of sich fallen lassen that distinguishes it from reckless abandonment. 
This is the idea that those who let themselves fall simultaneously heed the call of their true, 
innermost voice, the voice of destiny that addresses individuals directly and provokes them to 
live authentically. If, then, both Siddhartha and Gotama let themselves fall in the way 
prescribed at the end of Klein and Wagner, we will as well find instances where they heed 
their “truest, innermost” voice.  
This is certainly the case with Siddhartha, whose inner voice always spurs him on to a 
nobler, more authentic path. This may be through supporting his present efforts; for instance, 
as a precocious youth studying the sacred texts of the Vedas, Siddhartha hears a voice in his 
heart that tells him, “Weiter! Weiter! Du bist berufen!” [Onward! Onward! You have been 
called!] (GD3 679). Or, the voice may encourage him to abandon an inauthentic or stale 
course of life; he notes that he heard the inner voice “als er seine Heimat verlassen und das 
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Leben des Samanas gewählt hatte, und wieder, als er von den Samanas hinweg zu jenem 
Vollendeten, und auch von ihm hinweg ins Ungewisse gegangen war” [after he had left his 
home and chosen the life of the Samanas, and again, after he had left the Samanas to go to the 
Buddha, and also after he left him and went out into the unknown] (679). The inner voice 
seems to have a distinct plan for Siddhartha; it guides him onward to some predestined goal 
that he feels to be outside of his control.  
 There are, however, times when Siddhartha resists the inner voice, and these times, 
tellingly, are when he has steeped himself in a life of comfort and control. For instance, 
toward the end of Siddhartha’s spiritually idle years spent as a merchant in the city, the 
narrator explains how Siddhartha has lost touch with 
Jenes hohe, helle Wachsein, welches er einst, auf der Höhe seiner Jugend, 
erlebt hatte, in den Tagen nach Gotamas Predigt, nach der Trennung von 
Govinda, jene gespannte Erwartung, jenes stolze Alleinstehen ohne Lehren 
und ohne Lehrer, jene geschmeidige Bereitschaft, die göttliche Stimme im 
eigenen Herzen zu hören. 
 
That high, bright wakefulness, which he had experienced once, at the height of 
his youth, in the days following Gotama’s sermon, after he had parted from 
Govinda, that tense expectation as he stood proud and alone without teachings 
and without teacher, that supple readiness to listen to the godlike voice in his 
own heart. (GD3 673) 
 
Though Siddhartha once stood ready to heed the call of his inner voice, after years of 
decadent, inauthentic living, this same voice “war allmählich Erinnerung geworden, war 
vergänglich gewesen” [had slowly become a memory, had faded.] (673). In a direct repetition 
of the language of Klein and Wagner, Siddhartha at this low point in his life dreams of “einen 
kleinen seltenen Singvogel” [a small, strange songbird] (GD3 678; above, p. 48), symbol for 
his inner voice, that grows mute and dies. He is disregarding the inner call of his destiny; we 
can therefore reason that he is not letting himself fall.  
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The compatibility of the “inner voice” with sich fallen lassen is not limited to the case 
of Siddhartha, but extends to Gotama as well. As Siddhartha departs from the Buddhist camp, 
he thinks to himself, 
Warum war Gotama einst, in der Stunde der Stunden, unter dem Bo-Baume 
niedergesessen, wo die Erleuchtung ihn traf? Er hatte eine Stimme gehört, eine 
Stimme im eigenen Herzen, die ihm befahl, unter diesem Baum Rast zu 
suchen, und er hatte nicht Kasteiung, Opfer, Bad oder Gebet, nicht Essen noch 
Trinken, nicht Schlaf noch Traum vorgezogen, er hatte der Stimme gehorcht. 
So zu gehorchen, nicht äußerm Befehl, nur der Stimme, so bereit zu sein, das 
war gut, das war notwendig, nichts anderes war notwendig.  
 
Why had Gotama once, in the hour of hours, set himself down under the Bodhi 
Tree, where he found enlightenment? He had heard a voice, a voice in his own 
heart that ordered him to find rest under this tree. And he had not put 
mortification, sacrifice, bath or prayer, nor eating or drinking before this. He 
had obeyed the voice. To obey in this way, and not some external command, 
but the voice, in this way to stand ready, that was good, that was necessary, 
nothing else was necessary. (GD3 652) 
 
Gotama, just as Siddhartha, is singled out as a person who both lets himself fall and stands 
ready to heed the call of his inner voice. As there are no other characters to whom Siddhartha 
attributes these two qualities, it is most likely the case that they are inseparable parts of an 
attitude that Siddhartha and Gotama share.  
It would be a mistake think that Siddhartha might just be projecting onto Gotama. 
Rather, he is presenting a concept central to Hesse’s work as a whole: Schicksalbereitsein, 
that is, being prepared for one’s destiny, no matter where it may lead or what the 
consequences might be. This idea is present in Hesse’s work as early as 1904, in his short 
biography of St. Francis, Franz von Assisi [Franz von Assisi] (cf. 9-12). Beginning with 
Demian (1917), however, which is written just two years prior to Siddhartha, the concept 
comes to full bloom. As a sign of things to come in Siddhartha, there is even a passage in 
Demian in which the Buddha is described as “prepared for destiny” (schicksalbereit): 
Alle Menschen die auf den Gang der Menschheit gewirkt haben, alle ohne 
Unterschied waren nur darum fähig und wirksam, weil sie schicksalbereit 
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waren. Das paßt auf Moses und Buddha, es paßt auf Napoleon und auf 
Bismarck. Welcher Welle einer dient, von welchem Pol aus er regiert wird, 
das liegt nicht in seiner Wahl.  
 
All humans who have affected the course of humankind, all without exception 
were capable and efficacious only because they were prepared for destiny. 
This applies to Moses and Buddha, to Napoleon and Bismark. Whichever 
surge they served, from whichever pole they were governed – that is not for 
them to choose. (GD3 239) 
 
This passage is particularly important as it shows just how varied individuals who accept 
their destinies can be. The juxtaposition of Buddha and Bismarck, Moses and Napoleon, is 
certainly not meant to imply that these men have similar moral valuations or world visions. 
They are governed, in the words of Demian, from different poles, from different sides of the 
spirit. It is no surprise, then, that Siddhartha and Gotama, who hold opposite worldviews, can 
nonetheless stand united in their readiness to accept their destinies, that is, in their common 
attitude of sich fallen lassen. 
The Smile as Symbol of sich fallen lassen in Siddhartha 
 We have yet to demonstrate that Siddhartha and Gotama’s shared attitude of sich 
fallen lassen is, as in Klein and Wagner, the reason for their smiles. If this is the case, 
Gotama and Siddhartha should be seen to smile at moments when they let themselves fall. 
Specifically, they should smile at moments when they either abandon a stagnant way of life 
that prevents them from fulfilling their destinies, or when they heed the call of their inner 
voice.  
In the case of Siddhartha, this trend is established from the first instance of the smile 
in the entire novel. At the end of the first chapter, Govinda joins Siddhartha as he flees from 
his home city to join the Samanas. In the final two lines, they have the following exchange: 
»Du bist gekommen«, sagte Siddhartha, und lächelte. 
»Ich bin gekommen«, sagte Govinda. 
 
“You came,” said Siddhartha, and smiled. 
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“I came,” said Govinda. (GD3 625)  
 
Despite its brevity and apparent banality, this passage is one of the most revealing in the 
entire work. For Siddhartha smiles, and Govinda does not. This small detail is not only 
paradigmatic of the main difference between Siddhartha’s and Govinda’s characters, but also 
the connection between sich fallen lassen and the smile. Throughout the novel, Govinda is 
repeatedly characterized as an emulator, one who, as Siddhartha describes, has neither law 
nor doctrine in his own self; he is no stone, but a leaf, wavering and whirling in the wind 
(above, p. 51). Govinda always takes after someone or belongs to some greater organization; 
his identity is always relative to someone or something other than himself, whether this be 
Siddhartha or Gotama’s teaching (GD3 648-49). Siddhartha, on the other hand, is 
characterized by his autonomy and willingness to heed the call of his own destiny. As we saw 
above (p. 54), this includes this same moment, when Siddhartha “had left his home and 
chosen the life of the Samanas.” This small exchange between Govinda and Siddhartha, then, 
is crafted with a deliberateness that is not obvious at first glance. Siddhartha smiles because 
he – and he alone – has made the choice to let himself fall away from his life among the 
Brahmans. Govinda, on the other hand, is following Siddhartha along Siddhartha’s own path; 
he is merely acting as Siddhartha’s “Begleiter, …sein Diener, … sein Speerträger, … sein 
Schatten” [attendant,  …his servant,  …his spear-carrier, …his shadow] (GD3 618). Govinda 
cannot be granted the smile because he does not let himself fall, but catches himself in the net 
of Siddhartha’s plan. 
As Siddhartha later settles into his stagnant and inauthentic life in the city, his smile 
disappears. It does not reappear until he finally makes the decision to abandon this way of life 
and once again hears his dying inner voice. A longer scene from the chapter “Sansara” 
[Samsara] depicts this shift perfectly:  
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Da wußte Siddhartha, daß das Spiel zu Ende war, daß er nicht mehr spielen 
könnte. Ein Schauder lief ihm über den Leib, in seinem Innern, so fühlte er, war 
etwas gestorben.  
...Jenen ganzen Tag saß er unter dem Mangobaume… Er saß noch als die 
Nacht angebrochen war. Als er aufschauend die Sterne erblickte, dachte er: ,,Hier 
sitze ich unter meinem Mangobaum, in meinem Lustgarten.” Er lächelte ein 
wenig, – war es denn notwendig, war es richtig, war es nicht ein törichtes Spiel, 
daß er einen Mangobaum, daß er einen Garten besaß? 
Auch damit schloß er ab, auch das starb in ihm. Er erhob sich, nahm Abschied 
vom Mangobaum, Abschied vom Lustgarten. …[Er] dachte an sein Haus in der 
Stadt, an sein Gemach und Bett, an den Tisch mit den Speisen. Er lächelte müde, 
schüttelte sich und nahm Abschied von diesen Dingen.  
 
Siddhartha knew that the game was up, that he could no longer play along. A 
shudder ran down his spine. He felt that something deep inside of him had died. 
 That whole day he sat under his mango tree… He was still sitting there as the 
day turned to night. As he looked up and beheld the stars, he thought to himself,  
“Here I am, sitting under my mango tree, in my pleasure garden.” He smiled 
slightly. Was it really necessary, was it right that he owned a mango tree and a 
garden? Wasn’t it all just a fool’s game?  
He also brought that to an end, that also died in him. He stood and bid farewell 
to his mango tree, bid farewell to his pleasure garden. …[He] turned his mind to 
his house in the city, to his chambers and his bed, to his table decked with food. 
He smiled tiredly, shook himself, and bid farewell to all these things. (GD3 680) 
 
This is the first time Siddhartha smiles since beginning his stagnant, inauthentic life as a 
merchant in the city. His smile, then, represents his return to his destined path; just as he 
smiles for the first time in years, he shakes himself free of his attachment to the creature 
comforts that have stifled his inner voice and bids farewell. To borrow the words of Klein 
and Wagner, Siddhartha lets himself fall out of “his small, confined, artificially guarded life” 
(above, p. 46) and plunges freely back into the stream of his destiny. It is no coincidence that 
at just this moment when Siddhartha abandons his life in the city, his lover Kamala releases 
“einen seltenen Singvogel” [a strange songbird] – symbol of Siddhartha’s inner voice – from 
its cage and lets it fly free (GD3 681; cf. above, p. 54).  
In the case of Gotama, the connection between sich fallen lassen and the smile is less 
apparent. Nonetheless, we can assume such a connection. For Gotama is a “Vollendete” 
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[Perfect One] (e.g., GD3 645), that is, one who has entrusted himself to and attained his 
destiny. He goes no one’s way but his own (Der Buddha ging seines Weges) (637), in other 
words, he is constantly letting himself fall. Furthermore, he is constantly smiling. As well, the 
scenes in which Siddhartha sits under his mango tree (above, p. 58) and Gotama under the 
Bodhi tree (above, p. 55) are so similar that we must imagine Gotama, like Siddhartha, 
smiling. In this moment of his enlightenment, Gotama bids farewell to the unnecessary things 
that contain and guard his life. Just as Siddartha, he shakes himself of the past and turns 
himself back to what is necessary: to heed the inner voice, to let himself fall into his destiny, 





















The Chinese Smile 
 
Mein Heiliger ist indisch gekleidet, seine Weisheit 
steht aber näher bei Lao Tse als bei Gotama. 
[My saint is dressed like an Indian; his wisdom, 
however, is closer to Laozi’s than Gotama’s.] 
- Hesse to Stefan Zweig,  Nov. 27, 1922 
  
 So far, we have viewed the smile of the two Siddharthas (Siddhartha Gotama and 
Siddhartha the protagonist) as the bodily expression of their shared attitude of sich fallen 
lassen. Furthermore, we have treated the latter as a concept peculiar to Hesse. There is, 
however, good reason to believe that sich fallen lassen is itself Hesse’s reworking of a 
philosophical attitude which came into existence millennia before he was even born, namely, 
Chinese Taoism. At first glance, this claim might strike us as paradoxical. Considering that 
Siddhartha is Hesse’s most unabashed appropriation of Indian themes and symbols, one 
could only expect that its message would remain true to the subcontinent. Yet, as we saw in 
the second chapter, Hesse rather ironically considers his “Indian Tale” to be his 
“emancipation from Indian thought” (above, p. 27). The missing half of this statement is that 
it was as well his flight to China. 
In this chapter, we will dissect Hesse’s assessment of Chinese, specifically Taoist, 
philosophy as both a middle ground between world-affirmation and denial, and a gateway to 
their reconciliation. We will then go on to show how Hesse’s understanding of Taoism is 
reflected in the attitude of sich fallen lassen, and draw out the implications this has for our 
analysis of Siddhartha. This chapter, then, will serve to strengthen our primary claim: that 
Siddhartha can be read as Hesse’s attempt to reconcile the Schopenhauerian and Nietzschean 
worldviews.  
“Chinese” Thought Between the Poles 
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As we saw above (p. 14), Hesse notes that after reading Schopenhauer and Karl 
Neumann, translator of the Buddha’s Discourses, he “understood all of Buddhism as 
resignation and asceticism, as flight into wishlessness.” Hesse continues to explain that it is 
not until he encounters the recently produced translations of the Tao Te Ching by Julius Grill 
(1910), and more importantly, Richard Wilhelm (1911), that his understanding of East Asian 
thought, in his own words, “erfuhr eine Bereicherung und teilweise Korrektur” [experienced 
an enrichment and partial correction]. Specifically, his previous fascination with the life-
denying tendency of Indian thought begins to disappear more and more from his thinking 
(MS1 340).  
Most important for us is how Hesse summarizes his transition from Indian to Chinese 
thought. He writes,  
...Für mich bezeichnete ich diese Wendung zuweilen als eine Wendung von 
Indien nach China, d.h., von dem asketischen Denken Indiens zu dem 
bürgerlichen, »bejahenderen« Chinas.  
 
…From time to time, I thought of this shift as a turning away from India 
toward China, that is, from the ascetic thinking of India toward the civil, 
“more affirming” thought of China. (MS1 340) 
 
Hesse, that is, attempts to fit the unfamiliar thought of China within the binary scheme of life-
affirmation and denial familiar to the philosophical heritage of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. 
His use of scare-quotes around “more affirming” (»bejahenderen«) even suggests that he is 
aware of the superficiality of his interpretation. Furthermore, this binary scheme implies two 
poles: life-affirmation and life-denial, with ascetic Indian philosophy being associated with 
the latter. But Hesse does not assert that Chinese philosophy represents the other pole, that is, 
pure life-affirmation. Rather, it is “more affirming,” that is, it lies somewhere between the 
two poles.  
That Hesse needs to fit ancient Chinese thought into the familiar conceptual scheme 
of affirmation and denial becomes more understandable when we observe his first, utterly 
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disorienting encounter with a translation of Confucius’ Reden [Analects] (1910). It is the first 
in a ten-volume series of canonical Chinese texts being translated by German missionary and 
sinologist Richard Wilhelm,28 and Hesse reviews it as soon as it is released. He writes, 
...So froh wir ähnliche Erschließungen, namentlich der indischen Altertümer, 
sonst begrüßen, so stehen wir doch gerade den Chinesen in vollkommener 
Fremdheit gegenüber. Wir empfinden alles, was von dort kommt, als fremd, 
anders auf einem anderen Rhytmus, ja Lebensgesetz beruhend als unser Sein 
und Denken.  
...Immer wieder hat man die Gefühl, eine fremde Luft zu atmen, welche von 
anderer Art und Zusammensetzung ist als die, die wir zum Leben brauchen.  
 
…Whereas we gladly greet similar insights, in particular those into ancient 
India, our confrontation with the Chinese leaves us feeling completely 
estranged. We receive everything that comes from there as strange, resting in 
another way on another rhythm, indeed, on another law of life than our own 
being and thinking. 
...Again and again, one feels that he is breathing a strange air, one of 
another kind and composition as that which we require to live. (MS1 48) 
 
Along with its orientalist sentiments, the passage reveals an important trend in Hesse’s 
understanding of Chinese culture and thought. He hammers in the idea of otherness; almost 
every descriptor he uses is “strange” (fremd) or “other” (anders). The Chinese are different 
not only in their way of life, but in their very being. They breathe a strange air inimical to 
Hesse and his German audience. They are other, and as such, they are not understandable. In 
comparison with the works of ancient India, which have by this point already been subjected 
to the European frame of understanding – specifically, as Hesse himself notes, by 
Schopenhauer, who “prepared” Germany for Indian thought (MS1 73) – Chinese thought 
poses a new and dangerous other, a new threat to Europe’s sense of self that has yet to be 
conquered and categorized. 
Nonetheless, Hesse’s still believes that Chinese thought, once integrated, could 
possibly serve as a corrective to the spiritual suffocation of a heavily industrialized, 
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capitalized, and war-hungry Europe (cf. Aus Indien 203f). As he writes in his review of the 
Analects:  
Das nötigt uns, unsere eigene individualistische Kultur auch einmal nicht als 
selbstverständlich, sondern im Vergleich mit ihrem Widerspiel zu betrachten. 
Und dabei bleibt es nicht, sondern es entsteht im Lesenden manchmal für 
Augenblicke die seltsam aufleuchtende Vorstellung der Möglichkeit einer 
Synthese beider Welten. 
 
We are obliged to consider our own individualistic culture for once not as self-
evident, but rather in comparison with its opposite. But this is certainly not the 
end of the matter, for sometimes there are moments when the reader is struck 
by the possibility of a synthesis of both worlds. (China 158) 
 
Of specific interest for Hesse in regard to this idea of a “synthesis of both worlds” is 
Laozi’s Tao Te Ching. In a newspaper article from the Summer of 1919, Hesse even claims: 
“Die Weisheit, die uns nottut, steht bei Lao Tse, und sie ins Europäische zu übersetzen ist die 
einzige geistige Aufgabe, die wir zur Zeit haben” [The wisdom we need most is to be found 
in Laozi, and to translate this same wisdom into European is the only spiritual task we have at 
the moment] (MD1 142). Hesse, then, recognizes that canonical works of ancient China like 
the Tao Te Ching are of no use to a spiritually impoverished Europe unless they are first 
translated into familiar words and concepts. This explains why he attempts to locate Chinese 
thought within the scheme of “life-affirmation and denial” supplied by Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche: the latter are simply the terms used to understand and describe “Oriental” thought 
at the time.  
For instance, a contemporaneous work on Indian philosophy by Albert Schweitzer 
(1875-1965), Die Weltanschauung der indischen Denker [The Worldview of Indian Thinkers] 
(1935), is anchored in the terms “world-affirmation/denial” and “life-affirmation/denial.” 
Hesse himself reviews Schweitzer’s book, describing the author as “tapfer” [bold] and “ein 
vorbildlicher Abendländer” [a model Westerner] (MS 1 225). Schweitzer, Hesse continues,  
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betrachtet in einem lebendigen, krafvollen und äußerst anregenden Buch »Die 
Weltanschauung der indischen Denker«… Er tut es mit Energie und mit 
großer Reinlichkeit… streng um Objektivität bemüht  
 
observes “the worldview of Indian thinkers” in a lively, powerful, and utterly 
inspiring book... He does it with energy and great purity… concerned with 
objectivity. (ibid 225-26)  
 
In the entire review, there is no suggestion that Hesse takes any umbrage at Schweitzer’s 
adherence to a Schopenhauerian-Nietzschean terminology. In fact, Hesse even criticizes 
Schweitzer because the latter “überbetont die »Weltverneinung« als eine rein indische 
Angelegenheit” [overemphasizes “world-denial” as a purely Indian concern]. In other words, 
Hesse considers “world-denial” to be a hermeneutic category that should be extended beyond 
studies of Indian thought. 
As if to show how this theory can be put into practice, Hesse then uses Schweizer’s 
terminology of “world-denying” in reference to China. He writes that Schweizer 
hat für den kontemplativen Grundsatz des »Nichttuns« (den auch die gar nicht 
weltverneinenden Chinesen so wohl kennen) zwar Verständnis und 
intellektuelle Anerkennung, nicht aber das eigentliche Einfühlungsvermögen.  
 
undoubtedly has sympathy and intellectual appreciation for the contemplative 
principle of “non-action” (with which the Chinese, who are not all that world-
denying, are quite familiar) but nonetheless lacks the capacity to empathize 
with the thought. (MS 1 226) 
 
It is difficult to tell if Hesse, in saying that Chinese thinkers are “not at all world-denying,” 
has taken a more extreme stance, departing from the view he held in 1919 that they are 
simply “more life-affirming” than the thinkers of India. That is, in saying the Chinese are not 
at all world-denying, he may be implying that Chinese thought is absolutely world-affirming. 
However, this is not necessarily the case, for if Hesse meant to express the thought in such 
positive terms, he could have easily done so. In line with his earlier estimation, then, there 
seems to be a hesitance on Hesse’s part as to where exactly Chinese thought fits within this 
binary. He is certainly seeking to distance it from the world-denying tendencies of ancient 
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Indian philosophy and religion, but he is not entirely dedicated to calling it world-affirming. 
In this sense, his judgment seems to have remained the same: the most that can be said about 
the strange and ambiguous thought of China is that it is “more affirming” than the Indian, and 
in particular the Buddhist, worldview.  
Resting somewhere between the poles of world-affirmation and denial, Chinese 
thought, as Hesse understands it, offers a possible way to their reconciliation. That this is 
indeed the case will be seen in the following section. Specifically, we will observe how 
Hesse’s historical engagement with Chinese thought influences his development of both sich 
fallen lassen and the symbol of the smile. Both of these, as we have seen, are means of 
reconciling Siddhartha and Gotama, avatars of the Schopenhauerian and Nietzschean 
worldviews. 
God as Tao, Wu Wei as sich fallen lassen 
Before we can draw parallels between Hesse’s vision of Chinese, and specifically 
Taoist, philosophy and his concept of sich fallen lassen, we need to familiarize ourselves with 
the primary tenets of Taoism. First, there is the concept of the tao itself. The tao, which 
literally means the “way,” is the unutterable, primal source of all things. In Richard 
Wilhelm’s translation of the Tao Te Ching, which Hesse admires (MS1 53), Laozi writes, the 
tao is the “Anfang der Welt” [beginning of the world], the “Einheit” [oneness]. It is “des 
Geheimnisses noch tieferes Geheimnis: / …Die Pforte der Offenbarwerdung aller Kräfte” 
[the mystery nestled in a mystery: / …The gateway to the revelation of all powers]. In Julius 
Grill’s translation of this same verse, he equates the tao with Kant’s “Ding an sich” [thing-in-
itself], the incomprehensible essence of the world as representation. In 1911, Hesse himself 
refers to the tao as the “Urprinzip alles Seins” [the first principle of all Being] (MS1 50). 
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 The tao, as the primal source of all things, is also the point of harmony between 
everything that we, creatures trapped in time, regard as oppositional. In the forty-second 
verse of the Tao Te Ching, Laozi writes, 
Der SINN erzeugt die Einheit. 
...Alle Geschöpfe haben im Rücken das Dunkle 
und umfassen das Lichte, 
und der unendliche Lebensatem gibt ihnen Einklang.  
 
The Tao29 produces the oneness. 
…All creatures have darkness at their backs, 
and encompass the light, 
and the endless breath of life gives them harmony. 
In this sense, the notion of the tao likely influences Hesse’s portrayal of god in Klein and 
Wagner, and of the Om or the river in Siddhartha. All of these represent meeting points of 
opposites and the transcendent harmony of life and nature, in which all voices come together 
– voices of pain and love, good and evil, war and peace, yes-saying and no-saying voices. 
Indeed, the tao is even described as a river in the Tao Te Ching, for instance, at verse thirty-
two (Hsia 243). 
 The second Taoist concept we need to address is wu wei, or non-action, which is the 
main practical doctrine of Taoism. We should note first, however, that the common 
translation of wu wei as “non-action” is misleading. The idea is not to remain completely 
inactive, but rather, as American Taoism scholar, Livia Kohn, nicely puts it, “to do things the 
natural way, by not interfering with the patterns, rhythms, and structures of nature, without 
imposing one’s own intentions upon the organization of the world” (Encyclopedia of Taoism, 
vol. 2, 1067).  
Considering that Hesse studied every available German translation of Laozi’s Tao Te 
Ching (MS 1 341), he is undoubtedly aware of the Taoist concept of “non-action.” In Richard 
Wilhelm’s translation, for instance, we find in the third verse: “Das Nicht-Handeln üben: / so 
kommt alles in Ordnung” [Practicing non-action: / Thus everything comes into order]. In the 
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second verse: “Also auch der Berufene: Er verweilt in Wirken ohne Handeln” [Thus, too, the 
chosen one: / He abides in doing-without-acting]. In his explanatory notes to the second 
verse, Wilhelm writes, 
Die Lehre des »Wirkens ohne Handelns«, die das ganze Buch durchzieht, ist 
hier zum erstenmal ausgesprochen. ...Es ist das Wirkenlassen der 
schöpferischen Kräfte im und durch das eigene Ich, ohne selbst etwas von 
außen her zu wollen. 
 
The doctrine of “doing without acting,” which pervades the whole book, is 
enunciated here for the first time. …It is when one lets creative powers work 
in and through his own self, without interposing anything self-willed. 
 
Wu wei, then, is the deliberate giving-forth of the self to the tao. One allows the “creative 
powers” of the tao to express themselves through the self, without resisting. But this is not a 
mere surrender of the will; it is to attune oneself to a more authentic way of living. As 
contemporary Taoism scholar, Russel Kirkland, notes, the tao is “a natural guiding force that 
leads all things ineluctably to their fulfilment,” and as such, “the true matrix of authentic life 
in this world” (Encyclopedia of Taoism, vol.1, 305, 309). To assert one’s individual will 
against the tao and resist giving oneself forth to its power: that is the source of inauthenticity. 
The conceptual similarity between wu wei and sich fallen lassen is striking. Just as wu 
wei is a way of acting that is attuned to the rhythms of nature, the goal of sich fallen lassen is 
to fulfill one’s destiny, to cease resisting god’s will and find one’s ownmost voice in the 
divine chorus of the world. In both cases, individuals act authentically by giving themselves 
forth to god or tao; the root of inauthenticity, accordingly, is to resist, to interpose the 
individual will between the self and the divine source. The connection between the two 
concepts becomes even stronger when we recall Hesse’s claim that “The wisdom we need 
most is to be found in Laozi, and to translate this same wisdom into European is the only 
spiritual task we have at the moment” (above, p. 63). Hesse writes this in July of 1919, that 
is, just as he is completing Klein and Wagner and just before beginning work on Siddhartha. 
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Considering the enormous similarity between the two concepts, it is reasonable to conclude 
that sich fallen lassen is Hesse’s translation of wu wei into “European.”  
Strengthening this conclusion, we see Siddhartha himself juxtapose the concept of 
non-action with sich fallen lassen. He says to his lover, Kamala, 
When you throw a stone into the water, it hurries along the quickest route to 
the bottom. This is how it is when Siddhartha has a goal or intention. 
Siddhartha does nothing [Siddhartha tut nichts]. He waits, he thinks, he fasts, 
but he goes through the things of the world like a stone through the water, 
without doing anything [ohne etwas zu tun], without moving. He is pulled 
along, he lets himself fall [er läßt sich fallen]. His goal pulls him to itself, for 
he lets nothing enter his soul that could work against his goal. (above, p. 51; 
GD3 662-623; emphasis added) 
 
Judging by the way Siddhartha uses sich fallen lassen as a stand-in for non-doing (Nichts-
Tun30), we can reason that he means to establish the concepts’ identity or indiscernibility. He 
is certainly correct, for as we have seen, both concepts have the same goal, namely, that one, 
such as Siddhartha, harmonizes his actions with god, tao, or the “music of life.” Just as those 
who adopt the Taoist attitude of wu wei “do things the natural way, by not interfering with the 
patterns, rhythms, and structures of nature” (Kohn, above, p. 66), those who let themselves 
fall cease to resist the will of god and find their destined voices among the choruses of the 
world.  
 The connection between wu wei and sich fallen lassen is further strengthened when 
we note that the smile, as a symbol, is developed by Hesse in direct connection to his 
engagement with Chinese philosophy. Just as the smile is the objective correlative of sich 
fallen lassen in both Klein and Wagner and Siddhartha, it is also an ever-present motif in 
Hesse’s early Chinese and Chinese-influenced tales, for instance in “Der Dichter” [The Poet] 
(1913), Flötentraum [Flute Dream] (1913), and “Der Europäer” [The European] (1917-18). In 
these works, which draw heavily from Taoist thought, the smile takes on the significance of a 
moment of fulfilled destiny or a fusion of opposing forces. In “The Poet,” for instance, the 
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protagonist Han Fook smiles in the final lines, as he realizes that he has finally fulfilled the 
call of his heart and become a “vollkommener Dichter” [perfect poet] (GD3 286). In “Flute 
Dream,” a smiling boat man sings a song in which “Der Tod war Leben, und das Leben war 
Tod, und sie waren ineinander verschlungen... und dies war das Letzte und der Sinn der 
Welt” [Death was Life, and life was death, and they were engulfed in one another... and this 
was the final truth and the meaning of the world] (GD3 300). All of these early works point 
to a common ancestry between Hesse’s use of the smile and his burgeoning interest in 
Taoism, particularly its tendency to reconcile opposing concepts.  
Vasudeva: Falling, Smiling Taoist Sage 
 It is time to introduce the third and final31 smiling figure in Siddhartha, Siddhartha’s 
friend and mentor, Vasudeva. As is well noted by Hesse scholars, specifically Adrian Hsia, 
Vasudeva is a deliberate representation of the Taoist sage (Hsia 244ff). Vasudeva even 
paraphrases the Tao Te Ching to Siddhartha at times, saying, for example, “Du weißt, daß 
Weich stärker ist als Hart, Wasser stärker als Fels” [You know that soft is stronger than hard, 
water stronger than rock] (GD3 707-08). When we look to Wilhelm’s translation of the Tao 
Te Ching, we see that Vasudeva’s thought and language are lifted from the seventy-eighth 
verse:  
Auf der ganzen Welt gibt es nicht Weicheres als das Wasser.  
Und doch in der Art, wie es dem Harten zusetzt, kommt nichts ihm gleich. 
...Daß Schwaches das Starke besiegt 
und Weiches das Harte besiegt, 
weiß jedermann auf Erden. 
 
In the whole world there is nothing softer than water. 
And yet nothing compares with the way it erodes the hard. 
That the weak conquers the strong 
And the soft conquers the hard,  
everyone in the world knows this.32 (78) 
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Not only Vasudeva’s words, but also his characterization is in accordance with the 
Taoist sage. Just as the very first verse of the Tao Te Ching shows Laozi to be dubious of 
language, Vasudeva is described as “kein Freund der Worte” [no friend of words] (GD3 698). 
He lives by the river, spending his days mostly in silence, leaving his heart open to the 
rhythms of nature. He admits,  
Ich bin kein Gelehrter, ich verstehe nicht zu sprechen, ich verstehe auch nicht 
zu denken. Ich verstehe nur zuzuhören und fromm zu sein, sonst habe ich 
nichts gelernt. Könnte ich es sagen und lehren, so wäre ich vielleicht ein 
Weiser.  
 
I am no learned man. I do not know how to speak, nor do I know how to think. 
All I know is how to listen and be devout, otherwise I have learned nothing. If 
I could say it and teach it, then perhaps I would be a wise man. (GD3 697)  
 
Again, Vasudeva’s words can be traced back to Wilhelm’s translation of the Tao Te Ching, 
specifically the eighty-first verse, which reads: “Der Weise ist nicht gelehrt / der Gelehrte ist 
nicht weise” [The wise man is not learned, the learned man is not wise] (81; Weber 82).  
Vasudeva’s action, too, perfectly captures the Taoist principle of wu wei, non-action. 
For instance, as Siddhartha chases after his runaway son, Vasudeva tries to persuade him to 
let the boy go, for he “geht seine Bahn” [goes his own way] (712). When Siddhartha then 
ignores Vasudeva’s advice, Vasudeva still “hinderte [Siddhartha] nicht” [did not hinder 
Siddhartha] (712), though he knows that Siddhartha will only cause himself pain. Vasudeva, 
that is, lets the world take its course, without, in Livia Kohn’s words, “interposing his own 
intentions upon the organization of the world” (above, p. 66). 
Vasudeva, then, as a representation of the Taoist sage, would, by Hesse’s own 
interpretation of Taoism, occupy a middle ground between life-affirmation and denial. What 
is so interesting, then, is that he, just as Siddhartha and Gotama, is granted the symbol of the 
smile. Indeed, almost every description of Vasudeva makes reference to his smile or beaming 
face. Considering that Hesse’s symbolic use of the smile has a deep historical connection to 
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his engagement with Taoist philosophy, we can reason that Vasudeva is not simply, as Hesse 
describes him in a letter to a friend, “ein freundliche[r] alte[r] Trottel, der immer lächelt und 
heimlich ein Heiliger ist” [a friendly old halfwit who is always smiling and secretly a saint] 
(MS 1 163; Weber 82). He is, rather, the key to understanding the reconciliation of Siddhartha 
and Gotama. When we recognize that their smiles have the same symbolic significance as 
Vasudeva’s, we can trace these smiles back to Hesse’s specific engagement with Taoist 
thought, which is centered on the underlying unity and reconciliation of opposing forces.  
Furthermore, we can tell that Vasudeva’s smile signals that he, like Siddhartha and 
Gotama, lets himself fall, for at the very moment when he departs from his home and fulfills 
his destiny, his body dissolves into a beaming smile:  
»Ich gehe in die Wälder, ich gehe in die Einheit«, sprach Vasudeva strahlend. 
Strahlend ging er hinweg; Siddhartha blickte ihm nach… sah seine Schritte voll 
Frieden, sah sein Haupt voll Glanz, sah seine Gestalt voll Licht. 
 
“I’m going into the forest, I’m going into the oneness,” said Vasudeva, beaming.  
 Beaming, he went away; Siddhartha watched him go… saw his strides filled 
with peace, saw his face filled with radiance, saw his figure filled with light. 
(GD3 721) 
 
This moment, when Vasudeva, now the smile incarnate, takes his final step into the 
“oneness,” into the tao, into the house of god, is a perfect example of sich fallen lassen. It 
presents the culmination of Vasudeva’s destiny, the final heeding of his inner voice. As he 
says to Siddhartha,  
Ich habe auf diese Stunde gewartet, Lieber. Nun sie gekommen ist, laß mich 
gehen. Lange habe ich auf diese Stunde gewartet, lange bin ich der Fährmann 
Vasudeva gewesen. Nun ist es genug.  
 
[I have waited for this hour, friend. Now it has come. Let me go. Long have I 
waited for this hour, long have I been the boatman Vasudeva. Now it is 
enough] (721).  
 
Vasudeva has anticipated this destined moment for a significant length of time, and now that 
it has arrived – now that his destiny has displayed itself – he knows that he cannot resist its 
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call, even if this means abandoning his home and friend of twenty years,33 abandoning even 
his long-cherished identity. Smiling, he lets himself be drawn to his destiny and asks of 
Siddhartha to let him go.  
Vasudeva as Siddhartha’s Mentor 
 Vasudeva, the smiling Taoist sage who lets himself fall, also plays an important role 
as Siddhartha’s mentor. He teaches Siddhartha to listen to the river, to hear the “music of 
life,” the tao. Eventually, Siddhartha’s attunement to the world becomes indiscernible from 
Vasudeva’s:  
Oft saßen sie am Abend gemeinsam beim Ufer auf dem Baumstamm, 
schwiegen und hörten beide dem Wasser zu, welches für sie kein Wasser war, 
sondern die Stimme des Lebens, die Stimme des Seienden, des ewig 
Werdenden. Und es geschah zuweilen, …daß sie beide im selben Augenblick, 
wenn der Fluß ihnen etwas Gutes gesagt hatte, einander anblickten, beide 
genau dasselbe denkend, beide beglückt über dieselbe Antwort auf dieselbe 
Frage. 
 
During the evenings, they often sat together silently on the river bank on the 
tree branch, and both would listen to the water, which for them was not really 
water, but the voice of life, the voice of being, the voice of eternal becoming. 
And from time to time it happened… that both of them in the same moment, 
just as the river had said something good to them, would look at each other, 
both thinking the exact same thing, both delighted over the same answer to the 
same question. (699) 
 
For Siddhartha and Vasudeva, the river is a symbol of the fusion of opposites, of the 
interpenetration of being and becoming, of god or tao. It is, however, important to note that 
this passage does not make any claims as to their expressed worldviews. Siddhartha and 
Vasudeva remain silent and attune only their inner selves to the music that pours forth form 
the river: the music of life, of god, of the sacred Om that Siddhartha once heard as he let 
himself fall into these very same waters.   
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Just as Siddhartha’s inner experience of the world becomes more similar to 
Vasudeva’s, so does his appearance. Most notably, his smile begins to approximate that of 
the boatman: 
Und von Mal zu Mal ward sein Lächeln dem des Fährmanns ähnlicher, ward 
beinahe ebenso strahlend, beinahe ebenso vom Glück durchglänzt, ebenso aus 
tausend kleinen Falten leuchtend, ebenso kindlich, ebenso greisenhaft. Viele 
Reisende, wenn sie die beiden Fährmänner sahen, hielten sie für Brüder. 
 
And from time to time his smile became more like the boatman’s, became 
almost as beaming, almost as permeated with bliss. Like the boatman’s it 
shined out of a thousand tiny folds, like the smile of a child, like the smile of 
an elder. Many travelers, when they saw the two boat men, mistook them for 
brothers. (699) 
 
This passage is particularly important in demonstrating the correlation between the inner 
attitude of sich fallen lassen and the symbol of the smile. Just as sich fallen lassen, or wu wei, 
implies a recognition of the underlying unity of god or tao, the corresponding smile is a 
fusion of opposites: it is “like the smile of a child, like the smile of an elder.” 
 Under the mentorship of Vasudeva, Siddhartha finally ceases resisting and fulfils his 
destiny. Certainly, Siddhartha lets himself fall at earlier points in the book, but he always 
catches himself on something, be it his own pride, his life in the city, or his grief for his 
runaway son. It is not until Vasudeva encourages Siddhartha to truly listen to the river that 
Siddhartha finally “hörte auf, mit dem Schicksal zu kämpfen” [ceased to fight his destiny] 
(GD3 721). It should come as no surprise that in this same moment Siddhartha’s smile 
reaches its culmination: “Auf seinem Gesicht blühte die Heiterkeit des Wissens, dem kein 
Wille mehr entgegensteht” [On his faced bloomed the serenity of the knowledge against 
which no more will was opposed] (721). At this moment, too, Vasudeva’s mentorship is no 
longer needed. Siddhartha has harmonized his will with the transcendent harmony of nature. 
He has become a Perfect One, he has attained the goal, and Vasudeva can take his leave from 
his home, from the novel, and go into the woods, into the oneness.  
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Despite their attitudinal similarities and identical smiles, it would be imprudent to 
claim that Vasudeva and Siddhartha express their worldviews in identical fashions. Whereas 
Vasudeva is heir to the Taoist tradition of silence, or what Adrian Hsia refers to as 
“schweigendes Nichtstun” [silent non-action] (MS2 202), Siddhartha lays out a well-defined 
teaching in the final chapter. That is to say, when Siddhartha gives his final sermon, he is not 
acting as Vasudeva’s mouthpiece, for the latter’s worldview is tied up with his refusal to 
speak. In giving positive expression to his worldview – namely, a world-view of world-
affirmation – Siddhartha distances himself from Vasudeva, who silently takes no side. 
Vasudeva’s worldview, then, remains somewhere between or even outside of the poles of 
affirmation and denial; because it is not expressed, it cannot be precisely located. 
Nonetheless, Siddhartha and Vasudeva remain united in their inner, unexpressed relation to 
the world and its symbolic expression in the smile. 
We see again that two figures in Siddhartha, who give expression to their worldviews 
in different and even contradictory ways, are united by the symbol of the smile. Bringing 
Gotama back into the picture, there are in total three characters with differing worldviews 
who nonetheless represent a similar inner attunement to the world. Theodore Ziolkowski, one 
of the most formidable American interpreters of Hesse’s work, notes this as well, writing in 
his Novels of Hermann Hesse (1965):   
The smile is the symbol of inner perfection, but inner perfection for Hesse means 
the awareness of the unity, totality, and simultaneity of all being. It is thus 
appropriate that the three men [Siddhartha, Gotama, and Vasudeva] who share this 
perception should also share the same beatific smile, even though each reached his 
goal by following a completely different path. (172) 
 
Such an interpretation of the smile, though accurate, does not go far enough. For it is not 
simply that those who smile the divine smile possess knowledge of the transcendent unity of 
all things; what is most important is that they then adopt a particular attitude in relation to it. 
Furthermore, this attitude is not necessarily one of affirmation and love, as Ziolkowski 
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suggests (170). This is certainly true of Siddhartha, but it would be unfair to abstract from 
this one character alone. For as we have seen, Gotama, who advises his followers to detach 
themselves from and deny the world and its sufferings, smiles in same way as Siddhartha. 
What the smile represents must then be an attitude that carries within itself the potentiality to 
be expressed as both world-affirmation and denial. Within the frame of Siddhartha, this can 
only be said of sich fallen lassen, or wu wei, as both of these imply only a willingness to heed 
the call of destiny and find one’s voice within the chorus of the world. Yet, as we have seen, 
Hesse’s world chorus is not united in one pure and blissful note – akin to the final stanza of 
Walt Whitman’s “Mystic Trumpeter” – but is rather a cacophonous harmony, filled with 
voices of love, hate, suffering, joy, affirmation, denial, and everything in between.  
Gotama and Siddhartha as Taoists? 
 Our identification of sich fallen lassen with the concept of wu wei would seem to lead 
to the conclusion that Gotama and Siddhartha are Taoists and therefore, in Hesse’s terms, 
neither world-denying nor world-affirming. This is true in a sense, but nonetheless 
compatible with our overall analysis of Siddhartha. Specifically, sich fallen lassen represents 
an agential attitude – that is, an attitude that guides one’s actions – and not an expressed 
worldview. This means that Siddhartha and Gotama can act similarly, yet express themselves 
oppositely. 
 This interpretation, furthermore, is in line with both Siddhartha and Hesse’s own 
view. During Siddhartha’s sermon to Govinda in the final chapter, he says, “With your great 
teacher [Gotama], the thing is more dear to me than the words, his doing and his living more 
important that his speaking, the gestures of his hand more important than his opinions” 
(above, p. 43). That is to say, Siddhartha recognizes that he and Gotama are vastly different 
as regards their expressed beliefs, but what they hold in common is a particular way of going 
about, of acting in the world. He is setting up a categorical distinction between word and 
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deed; in regard to the former, they are opposites, to the latter, equals. Because their 
similarities and differences belong to different categories, they can coincide without 
contradiction.  
Hesse himself is in complete agreement with Siddhartha’s distinction between word 
and deed. In a review of Karl Neumann’s Discourses, which Hesse writes just as he is 
completing the final chapter of Siddhartha (cf. MS1 42), he explains: “Der Gedankeninhalt 
der Buddhalehre ist nur eine Hälfte des Werkes Buddhas, die andere Hälfte ist sein Leben, ist 
gelebtes Leben, geleistete Arbeit, getane Tat” [The thought content of the Buddha’s teaching 
is only a half of the Buddha’s work. The other half is his life, his lived life, his accomplished 
work, his done deed] (MS1 69). Without this distinction between word and deed, Siddhartha 
would collapse into a heap of contradictions. It is what allows Siddhartha to recognize the 
opposition of his and Gotama’s words, yet nonetheless say, “I know that Gotama and I are 
united” (above, p. 43). Siddhartha the protagonist says he affirms the world and Siddhartha 
Gotama says he denies it, but both are united in that they let themselves fall and live 
authentically, heeding only the call of their own individual destinies. The distinction between 












Siddhartha’s Smile: Solution or Aporia? 
 
 The irony of Siddhartha is that the title itself is ambiguous. On the one hand, it 
signifies Siddhartha Gotama, the Schopenhauerian, nirvana-seeking Buddha; on the other, it 
signifies Siddhartha, the Nietzschean, samsara-affirming protagonist. Yet, simultaneously, 
the title points to the reconciliation of this very ambiguity. For the name “Siddhartha” means 
“one who attains the goal” (cf. Dictionary of Buddhism 266). And as we have seen, in the 
context of the novel Siddhartha, those who attain the goal, those who fulfill their destinies, 
are those who let themselves fall toward god, Om, or tao. The expression of their goals may 
certainly be different: Gotama describes his goal as nirvana and Siddhartha describes his as 
the affirmation of samsara. Nevertheless, they are united in that they spring from a common 
urge to live authentically, to heed the divine call of their own hearts and enact the laws they 
find therein.  
 This is where Siddhartha breaks free of Georg Simmel’s conclusion in Schopenhauer 
and Nietzsche. For just where Simmel finds two fundamental, opposing urges of the soul, 
Siddhartha presents only one urge expressed by opposite worldviews. But a worldview must 
be expressed with words, and words are often misleading, as Siddhartha himself recognizes 
(GD3 724f.). They are nothing but half-truths, violent distortions of a felt wisdom that evades 
utterance. For this reason, two expressed worldviews can stand opposed to one another, yet 
grow from the same kernel of insight, just as one half of a sapling grows out of its seed and 
reaches upward toward open air and light, while the other digs downward into the dark and 
suffocating soil. Despite the apparent opposition of its appearance or expression, however, 
the sapling, the kernel of insight, remains a single organic whole. This is the realization that 
allows Siddhartha to exclaim to Govinda, “von jeder Wahrheit ist das Gegenteil ebenso 
wahr!“ [For every truth, the opposite is just as true!] (725).  
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 But there is another side to this realization, a shadow to Siddhartha’s smile. As we 
have seen, the smile is not just granted to Siddhartha, Gotama, and Vasudeva, relatively 
rational and pacifistic figures. It is also granted to the psychotic Wagner, whose “smile told 
that [his] deed had also been a way to salvation, a breath, a symbol” (above, p. 50). The 
smile, then, is indifferent to the moral character of those who wear it, be it those who preach 
love, compassion, and self-overcoming, or those who slaughter innocents. The Dalai Lama 
stands shoulder to shoulder with Dylan Roof. 
The trouble is, we cannot simply turn a blind eye to the case of Wagner. For, as we 
have seen, a reading of Klein and Wagner enriches our understanding of Siddhartha 
enormously, and both works complement each other so well in theme and language that they 
can be considered parallel texts. We seem, then, to have reached an aporia, an impasse in our 
understanding of the text: drawing from the concept of sich fallen lassen as presented in 
Klein and Wagner, we can understand Hesse’s reconciliation of the antithetical worldviews 
of Siddhartha and Gotama, yet simultaneously, the concept of sich fallen lassen may 
undermine the viability of this same reconciliation. 
Hesse himself recognizes the paradoxical nature of his aesthetic vision at the time of 
Siddhartha, as well as the unwelcome conclusion to which it leads. In a long journal entry 
from February 17, 1921, after ruminating on sich fallen lassen (MS1 21), he writes, 
Ich weiß nicht, ob ich, mit meinem Versuch zu Freiheit und Eingehen auf das 
Chaos... [eine] große Gefahr, ein... großer Schädling bin. Ich verlange von mir 
Zurückgehen hinter die Gegensatzpaare, Annehmen des Chaos. ...Wenn nun 
einer diesen Weg geht, ...so ist durchaus nicht gesagt, daß er nun über kurz 
oder lang eine bessere, wahrere, höhere Moral oder Lebensordnung finden 
werde! Er kann ebensogut, sogar weit wahrscheinlicher, ...wahnsinnig und 
Verbrecher werden. 
 
I don’t know if I, with my attempt at freedom and entering into chaos, …am 
[a] great danger… a great pest. I demand of myself the retreat behind the pairs 
of opposites, the indulgence in chaos. …Yet when one goes this way, …it is 
not a given that he will sooner or later find a better, truer, and higher morality 
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or way of life! Just as well – indeed, what is more likely to be the case – he 
can… go crazy and become a criminal. (MS1 25) 
 
The end of this passage is certainly a reference to Wagner, as Hesse establishes the latter’s 
killing spree – just as the Buddha’s week-long meditation under the Bodhi Tree, Siddhartha’s 
flight from his stagnant life in the city, and Vasudeva’s final steps into the woods and the 
oneness – as an instance of letting himself fall, of casting away his inherited valuations and 
heeding the call of his perceived destiny.   
 Still, to dismiss Hesse’s vision of sich fallen lassen as nihilistic because of Wagner 
might be too rash a response. For in the same journal entry, Hesse continues to add,  
Ich weiß selber noch nicht recht, woher ich den stillen Glauben habe, daß es 
trotzdem nicht so gehen werde, wenn ein Mensch in meinem Sinn jenen Weg 
ins Chaos geht – vielleicht ist es nur ein Rest von… Moral in mir. 
 
I still don’t know where I got the tacit belief that it nevertheless won’t happen 
that way if and when a person, in my sense of the term, travels that path into 
chaos – perhaps it’s just a remainder of… morality in me. (MS1 25) 
 
Hesse wants to embrace a way of understanding that can reconcile the opposition of “Ja und 
Nein, Gut und Böse” [yes and no, good and evil] (ibid.), but he knows that this might leave us 
with no way to filter the noble from the despicable. His vision, he recognizes, demands some 
moral ground, some basic sense of goodness; otherwise, it leaves us falling, in Nietzsche’s 
words, “through an eternal nothingness” (above, p. 48). In these pages, then, we are presented 
with a Hesse who, at the time of the composition of Siddhartha, is struggling to come to 
terms with his own aesthetic ideal. 
 Thus to make an apodictic claim about the viability of Hesse’s vision in Siddhartha – 
to praise it as a triumphant synthesis of the human spirit or scorn it as nihilistic – would be to 
do violence to a text so rich in ambiguity. For Siddhartha, as Laozi would put it, is “a 
mystery nestled in a mystery” (above, p. 65). It is the product of a lived life, the work of a 
human who drew inspiration from all corners and facets of human culture, regardless of their 
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apparent opposition: from antiquity and modernity, “Orient” and “Occident,” Wagner and 
Buddha, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. The opposing worldviews expressed in Siddhartha – 
Gotama’s and Siddhartha’s, Schopenhauer’s and Nietzsche’s – are but the various branches 
of Hesse’s own thought. Their reconciliation is a groping in the dark, an attempt – a search, 
























1 Hesse never mentions Simmel’s Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in his published work, but only refers to Simmel 
in reference the latter’s pupil, Martin Buber (W18 475; W19 302, 500). As Hesse would certainly have much to 
say about Simmel’s lectures if he had read them, we can assume that he is not familiar with them. I thank Ulrich 
von Bülow and Volker Michels for this insight. 
 
2 So much has been written on the history of Hesse’s engagement with Nietzsche that I do not feel a detailed 
exploration is necessary. For a concise treatment of this topic, see Hong. For English speakers, see Reichert’s 
essay “The Impact of Nietzsche on Hermann Hesse” in Nietzsche's Impact. 
 
3 Adrian Hsia questions this time frame (36ff.), suggesting that Hesse’s primary engagement with Schopenhauer 
is at least seven years prior to 1904. The strongest evidence Hsia presents for this claim is a remark Hesse makes 
about reading a small book with passages from pessimistic authors, including Schopenhauer. As we have seen, 
however, Hesse claims to have read The World as Will and Representation in 1904, and there is no evidence to 
suggest that this is not the case. Indeed, when we look at evidence Hsia himself uses, specifically a letter from 
December of 1903, in which Hesse, like Schopenhauer, compares Christ with the Buddha (38), it becomes clear 
that he is having very Schopenhauerian thoughts at the time. Also, Hesse’s poem “Wir leben hin” [“We Live 
Forth”] from 1907 is filled with Schopenhauerian imagery and language. We will grant Hsia’s claim that Hesse 
is aware of Schopenhauer sometime in the 1890s, but maintain that his primary engagement with the latter’s 
philosophy is, in line with Hesse’s own claim, sometime around 1904.  
 
4 Schopenhauer is the first to establish pessimism as a legitimate philosophical doctrine. It is a direct response to 
the optimism of Leibniz (1646-1716), who claims that the world in which we live is the best of all possible 
worlds. Schopenhauer, however, sees our world as the worst of all possible worlds, his argument being that if 
the world were any worse, it simply could not exist or sustain life (WWV2 §46). “Pessimism” and “optimism” 
come from the latin pessimus and optimus, meaning “worst” and “best,” respectively. Thus the terms do not 
refer to hope or the lack thereof, as in contemporary usage, but rather to the quality of the world. 
 
5 Schopenhauer does, however, reason that Christ’s teaching was influenced by Indian thought, writing, 
“Christentum… hat indisches Blut im Leibe” [Christianity has Indian blood in its veins] (SvG §34).   
 
6 The importance of the law of causality within Buddhist doctrine is also stressed in Hermann Oldenberg’s 
Buddha, which Hesse studied. For instance, in a chapter titled “Das Nirwana” [Nirvana], Oldenberg translates 
the Buddha as saying, “Schwer wird es der Menschheit zu erfassen sein, das Gesetz der Kausalität, die 
Verkettung von Ursachen und Wirkungen” [It will be difficult for humanity to grasp the law of causality, the 
concatenation of causes and effects (Verkettung von Ursachen und Wirkungen).] The question of whether 
Hesse’s description of the Buddha is drawn from Oldenberg’s work, though of interest, is not at stake. What we 
are doing is simply drawing out the similarities between the worldviews of Gotama and Schopenhauer. 
 
7 A representation is, simply put, a reworking of raw sensory data into a mental picture of the world (hence re-
presentation). In this regard, it is similar to the use of the word “idea” in the works of English philosopher John 
Locke (1632-1704) and Scottish philosopher George Berkeley (1685-1753). However, as Schopenhauer has his 
own specific use of the word “idea” (Idee), it is best to avoid this translation. I stick with E. F. J. Payne’s 
translation of Vorstellung as “representation,” as Schopenhauer’s use of the word is borrowed from Kant, and 
Kant’s use of the term is most commonly translated as “representation.” Vorstellung can also be understood as a 
theatrical “presentation,” and Schopenhauer himself often describes the world as a stage. Cf. Shapshay’s 
discussion of translating Vorstellung.  
 
8 There is a certain absurdity in the proposition that receiving “external” sensory information occurs “prior to” 
the action of the a priori laws of space and time. Nietzsche hints at this in JGB §15. 
 
9 Schopenhauer’s reference to Kant at this point is actually a distortion of the latter’s philosophy. Kant does not 
think of the things of the world as “mere appearances,” but simply as “appearances.” That is, Kant does not 
consider phenomena to be less ontologically valid than the “thing-in-itself” of which they are representations. 
The point of Kantian transcendent idealism is that both realms – the realm of the thing-in-itself and the realm of 
the phenomena or representations – are equally true in reference to themselves. In fact, the point of his 
philosophy is to allow us to understand the realm of phenomena better so that we can live and think more 
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authentically and morally. As Simmel recognizes (196-98), Schopenhauer seems to have misunderstood this 
point or transformed it according to his pessimistic outlook. 
 
10 Cf. Schopenhauer: “Alles Leben [ist] Leiden ” [All life is suffering] (WWV 1 §46). This may also be an 
iteration of Oldenberg, who writes in his Buddha (1881), “Alles Leben ist Leiden: dies ist das unerschöpfliche 
Thema, das immer wieder bald aus den begrifflichen Erörterungen, bald aus der poetischen Spruchweisheit der 
Buddhismus uns entgegenklingt” [All life is suffering: this is the inexhaustible theme that we hear again and 
again in the conceptual discussions and poetic proverbs of Buddhism] (239).  
 
11 Though Gotama does not use the word thirst (Durst) in Siddhartha, we see the term used in previous chapters 
to connote attachment and desire (GD3 619, 627), so we may assume that Hesse is familiar with the concept. 
Furthermore, entire sections of Hermann Oldenberg’s Buddha and Neumann’s Discourses are dedicated to the 
Buddha’s exposition of thirst.  
 
12 The German is Kreislauf, which simply means cycle or circuit. In this context, it is probably being used in 
reference to the Buddhist concept of bhavacakra, literally the “wheel of becoming,” but more commonly 
referred to as the “wheel of life” (A Dictionary of Buddhism 31). 
 
13 I am admittedly simplifying things here, for Schopenhauer himself is ambivalent about whether the Will is or 
is not transcendent. At many points, he seems to assert that the Will is the Kantian thing-in-itself, that is, the 
object = x tha exists prior to perception and is (debatably) non-temporal and non-spatial. Schopenhauer, when 
he is being more attentive, says that the Will is only the thing-in-itself in a qualified sense (WWV 2 §18). 
Specifically, he means that the Will is still subject to the a priori law of time. Schopenhauer’s point, then, is that 
the Will is the closest thing to the Kantian thing-in-itself that we can experience, and thus, the thing we need to 
study if we want to come to the best possible understanding of the world. 
 
14 In Schopenhauer’s mind, matter itself is merely the immediate spatial manifestation of the Will (WWV2 §24). 
From a modern perspective, this may be understandable in terms of Einstein’s E=MC2. Just as Einstein’s 
theorem demonstrates that energy and matter can be thought of as convertible terms, Schopenhauer thinks of 
Will and matter as the same entity in two different forms. In both cases, we can have direct experience of one of 
the terms (matter) and cannot have a direct experience of the other (energy or Will).  
 
15 The translation of Wille zum Leben presents an interesting challenge. Leben can mean both “life” or “living.” 
In Schopenhauer’s philosophy, Leben implies rather an extremely dynamic state of being that is much different 
from the mere existence (Dasein) of a stone. In my view, “life” would imply a static state or object, so I have 
maintained Payne’s translation of “will to live,” which captures the dynamism of the concept. 
 
16 See especially Schopenhauer’s description of Javanese sea turtles who are annually eaten alive by wild dogs, 
who are then eaten by tigers (WWV2 §28, pp. 458-59). As he ends the description: “Dieser ganze Jammer nun 
wiederholt sich tausend und aber tausendmal jahraus, jahrein. Dazu werden also diese Schildkröten geboren. Für 
welche Verschuldung müssen sie diese Qual leiden? Wozu die ganze Greuelszene? Darauf ist die alleinige 
Antwort: so objektiviert sich der Wille zum Leben” [All this misery repeats itself a thousand and again a 
thousand times, year in, year out. It is thus to this fate that the sea turtles are born. For what guilt must they 
suffer this torture? To what end is this whole horrifying scene? There is only one answer: this is how the Will to 
Live objectifies itself.] 
 
17 Schopenhauer’s hereditary theory is undoubtedly one of his weakest points. His evidence for the assertion – 
that the will of the father and the intellect of the mother are passed on to the child – is grounded on the flimsiest 
evidence from biographies and literary works. It is nonetheless an important point of his philosophy to study, as 
it connects him to the heritage of philosophies and religions – for instance India’s Samkhya school – which see 
salvation as the escape of the (masculine) soul from the (feminine) world. 
 
18 In a move out of line with his typical self-aggrandizement, Schopenhauer even lets Buddhism get the very last 
say of the work. Following the last sentence of WWV1, which is meticulously crafted to mirror the very first (the 
entire work can be abridged to read: “Die Welt ist… nichts” [The world is… nothing]) Schopenhauer adds a 
footnote about the Buddhist concept “Pradschna-paramita, d.h. der Punkt wo Subjekt und Objekt nicht mehr 




19 The German is  Zurückkehren, and later Rückkehr, which may also be rendered as “returning” and “return,” 
respectively. However, for the sake of clarity, it is necessary to reserve the use of “return” for the German 
Wiederkehr, as this will be discussed extensively in the next chapter. Furthermore, the context of the passage 
does justify the somewhat negative sounding “reversion,” as Hesse continues, “Wenn Gott mich in die Welt 
hinaus wirft und als Einzelnen existieren läßt, Ist es dann meine Aufgabe, möglichst rasch und leicht wieder 
züruck ins All zu kommen…?” [If god throws me out into the world and lets me exist as an individual, is it then 
my task to come back to the All as fast and easily as possible…?] (MS1 21) Hesse is describing the (perhaps 
pathological) desire to return to a previous state of oneness with god, an idea which is captured by “reversion.”  
 
20 Cf. Z “Vor Sonnen-Aufgang” [Before Sunrise]:  “Ich aber bin ein Segnender und ein Ja-Sager” [I, however, 
am a consecrator and yes-sayer]; Z “Vom Kind und Ehe” [On Children and Marriage]: “Bist du der Siegreiche, 
der Selbstbezwinger, der Gebieter der Sinne, der Herr deiner Tugenden?” [Are you the victorious, the self-
conqueror, the commander of the senses, the master of your virtues?]; and FW §276: “Ich will irgendwann 
einmal nur noch ein Ja-sagender sein!” [Someday I want to be only a yes-sayer!]   
 
21 I conflate here Nietzsche’s “pessimism of strength” and “Dionysian pessimism.” For a detailed analysis of the 
similarities differences between the two, see Dienstag 161-200. 
 
22 The placement of this first iteration of the eternal return is deliberate: it comes directly before the final 
aphorism, which is simply the opening section of Nietzsche’s “jasagendste” [most yes-saying] work, 
Zarathustra (EH “Zarathustra” §6). Indeed, the eternal return represents, as Nietzsche admits in Ecce Homo, 
“den Grundgedanken des Zarathustra” [the principal thought of Zarathustra] (ibid. §1). 
 
23 Nietzsche does not explicitly state here that he is thinking of the Übermensch. However, this interpretation is 
made clear by the placement of the aphorism in question. As noted, it comes directly before the introduction of 
Zarathustra, whose first public sermon begins, “Ich lehre euch den Übermenschen” [I teach you the 
Übermensch]. Furthermore, in works following Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, Nietzsche would establish the 
affirmation of the eternal return as a defining characteristic of his new ideal, the Übermensch (e.g., JGB §56).  
 
24 For this reason, Nietzsche formulation of the question, “Willst du diess noch einmal und noch unzählige 
Male?” [Do you want this again and uncountable times thereafter?] uses the German modal verb “wollen” (to 
want), which is the root of the word Wille, the will.  
 
25 Govinda’s vision deliberately harks back to the eleventh chapter of the Bhagavad Gita, in which Krishna 
gives Arjuna the power of divine sight so that the latter may see and describe Krishna’s divine form. Just as the 
narrative purpose of Arjuna’s ecstatic vision is to clothe the abstract sermon of Krishna in understandable 
images, Govinda’s vision is to be read as the visual representation of Siddhartha’s previous attempt to teach 
Govinda his worldview with words and concepts. As Siddhartha’s teaching is itself drawn from his ecstatic 
vision on the riverside, it is clear that all three events – Siddhartha’s vision, his teaching, and Govinda’s vision – 
are different narrative explorations of the same idea or experience. This being the case, we will draw from all 
three simultaneously, as it would be redundant to go into each one individually. 
 
26 Hesse is likely using Wiederkehr in reference to a passage from “Von der Schenkenden Tugend” [“On the 
gift-Giving Virtue”] (§3) which is not in direct relation to the thought of the eternal return. Nonetheless, Hesse’s 
own use of “ewige Wiederkehr” in reference to the Buddha’s escape from rebirth (above, p. 40) shows that he is 
familiar with Nietzsche’s more radical use of the term and even conflates the latter with the Indian concept of 
reincarnation. 
 
27 Hesse uses the German “Vorschrift,” which is the etymological equivalent of the English “prescription” and 
carries the same ambiguity. Both can be taken in the sense of either a prescribed rule or prescribed medication. 
The word is well chosen, for the historical Buddha is often described as a physician, in that his established rules 
of conduct are directed toward the alleviation of suffering, both spiritual and physical. 
 
28 Among the other works in the series are, as we will see, Laozi’s Tao te king, Zhuangzi’s Das wahre Büch vom 
südlichen Blütenland [The True Book from the Southern Flower-Land]. As well,Wilhelm’s translation of the I 
Ging is included in this series, which is not only a stimulus for Hesse’s own Glass Bead Game, but also for the 
work of Carl Jung. The English translation of the I Ching popular among the hippie-movement in America 
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during the 1960s and ‘70s, which includes an introduction by Jung, is actually an English translation of 
Wilhelm’s translation (China 25).  
 
29 Wilhelm renders “Tao” as “Sinn”, the German word for “sense” or “meaning,” but acknowledges the arbitrary 
nature of his choice. See his “Vorwort” to Tao te king. 
30 Richard Wilhelm translates wu wei as Nicht-Handeln, whereas Hesse uses the term Nicht-Tun. However, we 
can be sure that Hesse is referring to the concept of wu wei because in his review of Schweizer’s Worldviews of 
Indian Thinkers he makes mentions the Chinese principle of “Nichttun” (see above, p. 7). Indeed, we can be 
fairly certain that Hesse himself is aware of the concept as wu wei, as Julius Grill even points out the translation 
of “wū wēi” as “nichts tun” in the notes to his translation of the Tao Te Ching, the first translation of the work 
that Hesse reads. Grill does, however, go on to warn that this choice is “verfehlt und irreleitend” [misguided and 
misleading] (p. 126). But he then clarifies this warning, stating that wu wei means “der Heilige verharrt in einer 
Tätigkeit, die nichts macht” [the saint perseveres in an action that does nothing]. Grill, then, is simply warning 
against the common mistake of thinking that wu wei implies absolute non-action, instead of an activity that is in 
line with the course of nature.  
 
31 Actually, there are two others: Kamala and an unnamed village woman. However, neither are granted the 
same divine smile that proceeds from an attitude of sich fallen lassen (cp. Ziolkowski at MS 2 153). Their smiles 
are, rather, mundane and ephemeral. For instance, as Siddhartha abstains from sex with the village woman, “Da 
wich vom lächelnden Gesicht der jungen Frau aller Zauber, er sah nichts mehr als den feuchten Blick eines 
brünstigen Tierweibchens” [All the magic vanished from the young woman’s smiling face. He saw nothing 
more than the dank look of a bitch in heat] (GD3 654). This passage in particular leads one to believe that the 
lack of divine female smiles in Siddhartha is due to Hesse’s well-noted misogyny.  
 
32 Berthold Brecht also makes use of this verse in his “Legende von der Entstehung des Buches Taoteking auf 
dem Weg des Laotse in die Emigration” [Legend of the Genesis of the Book Tao Te Ching on Laozi’s Way into 
Exile]. He writes, “Daß das weiche Wasser in Bewegung / Mit der Zeit den harten Stein besiegt. / Du verstehst, 
das Harte unterliegt” [That the motion of the soft water / comes to conquer the hard  stone. / You understand, the 
hard succumbs” (Gedichte IV 52). 
 
33 Here I adopt Siegfried Unseld’s interpretation that Siddhartha is split into three periods of roughly twenty 
years: Siddhartha leaves the Brahmanic village at about the age of twenty; he then remains in the city until he is 
about forty; and finally, his last meeting with Govinda is another twenty years after that (MS 1 371).  I would 
add to this that the structure of the novel may be based off a Confucian aphorism titled “Stufen der Entwicklung 
des Meisters” [Steps of the Master’s Development], specifically the lines: “Ich war fünfzehn und mein Wille 
stand aufs Lernen, ...mit fünzig war mir das Gesetz des Himmels kund, mit sechzig war mein Ohr aufgetan” 
[When I was fifteen my will was set on learning, ...when I was fifty I knew the law of Heaven, when I was sixty 
my ear was opened” (China 159). Hesse was familiar with the latter aphorism and even quotes it in the article 
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